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To the memory of Francisco de Assis Magalhães Gomes and to the 60th anniversary of CDTN, former IPR.
Nuclear Energy Development: Minas and BRAZIL
The ten largest economies and nuclear energy Initiatives for the use of biomass in Ligno Cellulosic Feedstock Biorefineries Parceria:
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Economy and Energy Organization - e&e OSCIP Nº 82: June/September de 2011 IISSN 1518-2932 _________________________________________________________
Texts for Discussion:
To the memory of Francisco de Assis Magalhães Gomes and to the 60th
anniversary of CDTN, former IPR.
José Israel Vargas
In an essay
published in March 2013, organized by my friend Márcio Quintão Moreno to
commemorate the centenary of birth of the remembered mentor, Francisco
Magalhães Gomes, whom I denominated “a scientist who believed”,
I said in my contribution that he was one of those improbable person that
to our astonishment we meet from times to times since it is so rare the
combination of sensitivity and vast humanistic culture, technical
formation of an engineer, of which our friend was so proud.
Living in an era
of great euphoria in the scientific field, specially in Physics, Magalhães
Gomes did not accept the timidity and underdevelopment of education and
research institutions in which his own generation was formed and which he
was committed to modernize.
He was an
undisputed pioneer in the start of nuclear and science studies areas in
Brazil and he was aware that it was not only the case of guaranteeing the
production of cheap energy because he rightly foresaw that nuclear
technology would be the driver of modernity since it demanded a high
degree of excellence in all the mobilized correlated domains.
One can add to
the legacy of moral category that we have received from him: the honest
intellectual, the generous, modest man who was glad with the success of
anyone, committed to the truth of science whose cultivation he induced in
the younger ones.
A first version of this
article was presented at Commemorative Symposium of the Birth Centenary of
Francisco Assis Magalhães Gomes organized by the Center of Nuclear
Technology Development – CDTN of the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission –
CNEN in August 2007 as part of the “3rd World Triga Users Conference”.
1.Introduction
In 1900, last
year of the 19th century, Lord Kelvin, in a speech at the
British Association for the Progress of Science, said that all big
problems of physics were virtually solved and, according to him, there
were two exceptions:
- The
explanation of the black body emission spectrum;
- Explanation of
the de Michelson and Morley experiment results about the velocity of light
relative to the movement of the Earth (of ether).
As we know, the
solution of these two problems mentioned by Kelvin, besides the
explanation of radioactivity (ref 1) and of the
photoelectric effect (ref 2), led to the
big science revolution of the 20th century with the development
of Quantum Mechanics, the Relativity Theory and the development of Nuclear
Physics. At that time many other very important discoveries came to light,
among them the fission of the atomic nucleus by the chemists O. Hahn and
F. Strassmann.
Later, this
discovery led to a revolution regarding the redistribution of the
political and economic power in the world and has created serious problems
that, we fear, will continue forever to accompany the human species, as
clearly corroborated by the events that presently pervade the
international conjuncture day in day out (ref 3).
Magalhães Gomes
was aware that the implementation of any independent nuclear program
presupposes the development of the
fuel cycle which implies:
1°) succeed in
mineral and geological research regarding uranium and thorium, as well as
other materials of interest, up to the production of the fuel elements
themselves containing or not uranium enriched in the isotope of mass 235,
or plutonium 239 which, as it is known, is artificially produced from
uranium 238;
2°) complete
mastering of design, engineering, process and production of relevant
materials;
3°) definition
of dimensions and economical aspects of the plants to be eventually
constructed comparatively to other existing options to satisfy future
demand; and finally
4°) in the long
term, it is necessary the definition of means to be adopted regarding the
storage after reprocessing of fuels already used during the lifetime of
power plants and that are highly radioactive (which emit radiations for
hundreds of years).
The Brazilian
Nuclear policy since 1946 has tried more or less successfully to follow
almost all these steps. As it will be see, it was preceded, already before
the last world war, by the development, even though incipient (in the
applied area), of human resources in basic nuclear physics and search of
radioactive materials, among them naturally uranium (source of one of the
three natural radioactive series), that became indispensable for the
future development of the sector. This tradition, albeit limited, gave
birth to leaders who would nourish the hope of national success regarding
the new energy technology.
Actually, the
early discovery in Brazil of radioactivity in hydro mineral waters
(notably in Poços de Caldas and later in Araxá, both in Minas Gerais),
indicating the occurrence of important nuclear materials (ref 4), was
contemporary to the advances in France, Germany, England and Italy of this
sector. From the latter came to Brazil Gleb Wataghin and Giuseppe
Occhialini, professors of young Brazilians, who were pioneers of the
Brazilian Nuclear Physics in São Paulo (ref 4).
A special
mention should be made of Bernard Gross who started in Rio de Janeiro in
1934 studies of cosmic radiations in the Division of Electricity and
Electric Measures of INT. The scientists Marcelo Damy de Souza Santos and
Joaquim Costa Ribeiro would participate in the first commission, created
in January 20, 1947, for the official control and inspection of strategic
materials (CFME) in the ambit of the National Security Council. Several of
these materials, as we have mentioned, occurred in our country, mainly
verified by the geology and geochemical group created in Minas Gerais by
the great geologist Djalma Guimarães. In fact, he has described in 1929
the occurrence of uranium associated with niobium- tantalum compounds (ref 5), in S. João
Del Rei.
Incidentally,
these studies reflected the influence of the great Viktor Goldschmidt,
leader of an important group created at the University of Göttingen, who
was the true father of modern geochemistry describing in a daring and
innovative way the distribution of chemical elements on the earth crust.
It is now known that Djalma Guimarães had close relationship with the
German researchers through a continuous correspondence with C. W. Correns,
member of the prominent Göttingen school. Confirmation of these contacts,
as well as several studies carried out by the Minas Gerais group about
nuclear materials along the subsequent decade, are described in the
notable historical survey published by Cláudio V. Dutra, one of the most
distinguished participant of the mentioned group (ref 6). It should be
remembered that the studies of these pioneers led to the discovery of
important phosphates reserves in Patos, Araxá and Patrocínio, in Minas
Gerais, as well as the niobium of Araxá, of high economic and strategic
value for Brazil. Recently, the MCTI has celebrated the development of
zircalloy for fabrication of
fuel elements. Niobium alloys could also be used for that purpose.
Before de 1940s
and also later, similarly to what happened with the Minas Gerais group,
many others have contributed in this research area, both in São Paulo and
Rio de Janeiro. In this period it should be mentioned the names of
Francisco Maffei and Luiz Cintra do Prado (São Paulo), Irnack Carvalho do
Amaral, Elisiário Távora, Alexandre Girotto, Sílvio Fróes de Abreu and the
already mentioned Bernardo Gross.
The drive of
these studies was notably accelerated due to the influence of Almirante
Álvaro Alberto da Motta e Silva and César Lattes, the co-discoverer of the
méson µ (ref 7). The former
represented Brazil in the then recently created United Nations Atomic
Energy Commission. This Commission tried to regulate the production and
the political consequences of the use of this new form of energy and the
promotion of internationalization and control of all nuclear materials (Baruch
Plan), rejected by Brazil. He has also decisively contributed to the
formulation of the clause called “specific compensations” for regulating
supply in exchange of materials of nuclear interest to the industrialized
countries that had important U reserves.
It is probable
that Admiral Álvaro Alberto’s position, as well as that of his Brazilian
colleges, was influenced in the short term by the publication in August
12, 1945 of the Smyth Report, which surprisingly made public, after six
days of the atomic bomb explosion in Hiroshima, important information
about the American program of military use of nuclear energy (ref 8). In the
introduction of this report, it is recalled that the application of the
E = mc2 equation
demonstrates that the transformation of 1 kg of mass in energy would
be three billion higher than that obtained from the burning of 1kg of
mineral coal, the fuel more commonly used from the industrial revolution
on, started in the 19th century.
Possibly, it is
the inestimable information contained in this report that led the National
Security Council to create at the beginning of 1947 the already mentioned
CEFME (Commission for the Study and Inspection of Strategic Materials). It
managed to promptly define uranium, thorium, besides beryl, boron,
cadmium, graphite and even radiogenic lead as materials of interest for
nuclear energy (Note 1). The
Commission decided that the ore of most of these materials, together with
niobium and zircon, would have their exploration, commerce and inspection
strictly controlled. Later, it was also decided that in case uranium
and/or thorium were minor components of any mineral, as in the case of
niobium from Araxá (which contains 2% of thorium), discovered by Djalma
Guimarães, the eventual explorer was obliged to return to the government,
without any charge for the latter, the equivalent of these elements in the
form of pure chemical compounds (ref 9). This decision
was adopted by suggestion of the Commission chaired by Prof. Francisco
Magalhães Gomes, and by Prof. Joaquim Maia (University of Ouro Preto),
Prof. José Israel Vargas and by the Engineer Luiz de Oliveira Castro.
Concurrently,
the international important repercussion about the discovery of the meson
with the participation of César Lattes has much contributed to our nuclear
policy. It was thought that the meson could catalyze nuclear fusion
through the reaction of proton with deuterium generating 5.5 Mev of energy
per event. In case this reaction would be possible, it would be able to
generate cleaner nuclear energy than that from uranium fission.
Unfortunately these expectations did not come true (ref 10).
2. The role of
CNPq
The verification
of the notorious insufficiency of Brazil regarding human resources as well
as research infrastructure motivated Admiral Álvaro Alberto and César
Lattes, supported by other scientists, to propose the creation of the
National Research Council (CNPq), made effective by the Law 1.310 of
January 15, 1951 of which Álvaro Alberto was the first president. He also
proposed in 1950 the measure made effective by the Decree 150 that
reinforced the limitations already established for the commerce of
strategic materials, notably uranium and thorium. As a consequence,
commerce of these elements would be possible only in operations from
government to government. According to Ninon Machado, this was an
anticipation of the monopoly of all nuclear activities, as will be seen
below, that would be valid until now. (ref 11).
CNPq, besides
the responsibility of stimulating research and development activities,
preparation of human resources in Brazil and abroad, would also be
responsible for the rigid control and inspection of the materials
mentioned above, using the Decree 438, of 1938, whose penalties would be
applied to those who did not observe the Law 1310.
Subsequently it
was established the Atomic Energy Commission in the ambit of the National
Research Council itself, composed of twelve members representing both the
government and the scientific community (Note 2).Soon after,
cooperation links were established with the United States and France,
notably through the French company “Société
des Produits Chimiques des Terres Rares”. This permitted careful
studies of uranium extraction contained in caldasite contained in uranium
from Poços de Caldas. For this purpose a group of chemists headed by
Alexandre Girotto, who managed to produce the first 900g of metallic
uranium from a Brazilian ore, was sent to France by CNPq. The process used
was the first international patent in the name of CNPq (ref 12).
Agreement with
Americans made possible research regarding nuclear minerals in different
areas of the country, mainly Minas Gerais, by the geologists Max White and
Gene Tolbert. This cooperation had frequently the presence of other
specialist from the U.S. Geological Survey (ref 10).
Research on
atomic minerals went on in collaboration with France under the aegis of
the Nuclear Energy Commission, oriented by Elisiário Távora, and by the
future Nuclebras. Reserves resulting from these studies and those from
Nuclebras, under the direction of John Milne de Albuquerque Forman,
permitted Brazil to have the sixth largest world uranium reserve (ref 13).
The known
uranium occurrences in Brazil are in the oriental part of the country and
are the following (personal communication with Prof. Umberto Cordani): the
two main ones Lagoa Real (Caetité, Ba) and Itatatia (Santa Quitéria, Ce)
are located in areas of outcropping old rocks (ages above 1800 My) but
which were heated and tectonically reactivated around 500-600 My. The
uranium minerals must have been formed in this last era. The same is true
for the Espinharas (PB) occurrence and maybe, for Amorinópolis (Go).
The Moeda
occurrence, in the Iron Quadrangle, near Belo Horizonte, is situated in
the meta-conglomerate of the Minas Group, aged about 2400 My. It is
possible that the uranium mineral has a similar age.
The Poços de
Caldas occurrence is situated in the volcanic massif with about 80 My and
the uranium minerals must be slightly younger.
The Figueira
(Pr) occurrence is situated in the Paraná Basin, in sandstone with about
300 My. The uranium minerals are younger and might be associated with
basaltic lava flow with about 130 My. (ref 14).
Concurrently
with the initial actions in the materials area, CNPq – directly
subordinated to the Presidency – had the support of the Physics Department
of São Paulo University (founded in 1934) and of the Brazilian Physics
Research Center (CBPF), created in 1949 by César Lattes, José Leite Lopes
and Jaime Tiomno, to start the implantation of the varied research
infrastructure in the country. Besides studies on cosmic radiation and
theoretical nuclear physics, CBPF was pioneer in studies regarding
condensed matter and nuclear chemistry, particularly applications of the
Mossbauer Effect, which had the leadership of Jacques Danon.
From 1951 on, a
betatron accelerator (Marcello Damy) and a Van Der Graff electrostatic
generator (Oscar Salla) were installed in São Paulo; in Rio de Janeiro it
was installed a Cockcroft-Walton accelerator and the assembling of a
cyclotron of reduced energy in the Navy Arsenal, by initiative of C.
Lattes, which was never concluded. Following these initiatives, the
Institute of Radioactive Research (IPR) in the University of Minas Gerais
was established in 1952, under the leadership of Francisco Magalhães
Gomes. In 1956 it was created the Institute of Atomic Energy in São Paulo,
under the direction of Marcelo Damy de Souza Santos; later the Institute
of Nuclear Engineering was installed in Rio de Janeiro, directly
subordinated to CNEN.
The program also
benefitted young physicists from Rio Grande do Sul, Gerhard Jakob, Darcy
Dillenburg and Fernando Zawislawski, who worked at IPEN under the
direction of Professor Marcelo Damy and in the Physics Department of the
Faculty of Philosophy, Science and Literature, under the orientation of
Professor Oscar Salla. This group was considerably amplified by the
presence of the distinguished German theoretical physicist Theodor Maris
and other foreign scientists.
Initially, IPR
carried out studies in the nuclear electronic area (Eduardo Schmidt
Monteiro de Castro; Magalhães Gomes was physics professor both at the
Engineering School and Faculty of Philosophy, Science and Literature of
the University of Minas Gerais); studies on prospection and physical
analysis of nuclear ores and materials (Cassio de Mendonça and Willer
Florêncio). The technique of nuclear emulsions, developed in Bristol and
successfully applied by César Lattes in his pioneer research in the area
of high energy physics (cosmic rays), was used (ref 10). Milton Vieira
Campos made studies of radiochemistry (after a period in Chicago); Cássio
Mendonça Pinto, (former collaborator of Fritz Feigel, in DNPM), Full
Professor of inorganic chemistry at the Engineering School and of
Physics-chemistry at the Faculty of Philosophy, has developed various
original methods for analysis of uranium and niobium mineral complexes.
Several young chemists, physicists, engineers and mathematicians were sent
abroad for training, including the author of the present article, who
attended in Chile the first Latin America nuclear chemistry course, given
by Alfred G. Maddock, his future Ph.D advisor professor at Cambridge
University.
3. The Atoms for
Peace program and the international situation of the nuclear sector
The three
Institutes soon had the benefit of the “Atoms for Peace” program, launched
by President Eisenhower in 1953. Three research reactors were installed in
São Paulo (IEA), in Minas Gerais (IPR) and in Rio de Janeiro (IEN),
respectively in 1957, 1960 and 1961. These equipments had an important
role in the development of application of nuclear techniques in the
country, notably in the use of radioisotopes in industry, in nuclear
chemistry, in radioprotection and in medicine. They provided training of
personnel who later would compose the Nuclear Engineering studies and
projects groups. It should be specially mentioned the Power Reactors Group
(GRP), created in the ambit of CNEN, that had a close French cooperation
from 1962 on. It was headed by Professor Jonas Santos from the National
Engineering School of the University of Brazil.
The power of the
Minas Gerais and São Paulo reactors, initially limited to 30 and 1,000 kW
(5000 kW nominal), respectively, were upgraded to 250 and 3,000 kW. The
Argonauta reactor of the Institute of Nuclear Engineering in Rio de
Janeiro maintained its power in 10 kW, and late it was added a low energy
cyclotron used for radioisotopes for nuclear medicine. The experience soon
acquired through the operation of those reactors, in the areas mentioned
above, can be traced in the various communications presented at the
Utilization of Research Reactors Meeting (ref 16) in São Paulo
in 1963, sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The
Brazilian delegation to this Meeting had 76 participants.
4. The
establishment of CNEN (1956 and 1962) and the relationship of Brazil with
the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Relative to the
institutional plan, it was created by presidential Decree Nº 4,011, and after ample
public debate, during the Kubitschek administration, the National Nuclear
Energy Commission, directed linked to the President of the Republic. It
replaced the commission previously created in CNPq, becoming independent
of it but with a different link. This link demonstrated the strategic
character of the nuclear sector assumed by the government. This
subordination was confirmed by the 1962 Law Nº 4,118, in spite
of the fact that the sector had undergone marked modifications up to the
adoption of the present structure, established by the May 28, 2003 Law Nº
10,683, which is shown in
Figure 1. The varied subordination of CNEN in the last 47 years is
described in
Nota 3.
Figure 1 -
Structure of the Brazilian Nuclear Sector.
The international relationships went on then always
with France and the United States. With the latter, the relationship,
started in 1952, renovated in 1954 practically was broken because that
country had not respected the “specific compensations” corresponding to
100 tons of thorium that Brazil would supply.
This policy of
specific compensation was later endorsed in 1962 with the definitive
establishment of state monopoly of the nuclear activities by CNEN,
established by the 1962 Law Nº 4,118. It
should be noticed that the interruption of uranium and thorium exports to
the United States also followed the recommendations of the Commission of
Strategic Materials Exports, created by the government for this purpose,
under the authority of the Foreign Affairs Minister.
These
initiatives resulted in a growing awareness that the existence of nuclear
weapons and the industrial production of energy using nuclear fission,
which would be intensified, would have deep repercussions in the
distribution and realignment of the world political and economic power.
Initially the
United States and Great Britain had, for a long time, a prominent role
regarding basic research, that supported the military and civil use of
nuclear energy, but France had also participated in the production of the
first nuclear artifact through the presence of various scientists from the
Fréderic Joliot-Curie Group.
The pioneer
countries soon tried to establish an international control system relative
to all aspects of the new energy use. This control included, as already
mentioned, the existing and to be discovered uranium ore deposits all over
the world. These initiatives failed due to the predominance of national
interests of other industrialized countries and the ideological
polarization that became evident at the end of the Second World War and
that divided the world until 1990 in two antagonistic blocks, under the
leadership of the two superpowers that emerged after the conflict – the
United States and the Soviet Union.
Brazil, as most
of the countries, was against these initiatives, as declared at the UN
Atomic Energy Commission by Admiral Álvaro Alberto because they were a
violation of the national sovereignty. From then on, our country has
systematically tried its own development which, however, had international
cooperation. Initially, as already mentioned, the American and French
partnerships were chosen (Note 4).
5. The IAEA and the
evolution of the international safeguards system. The Brazilian role. The
cooperation with France
The monopoly of
nuclear weapons was initially broken by the Soviet Union (1949), England
(1952), France (1960) and China (1960) and was amplifying the military
atomic club that was composed initially only by the United States, England
and the Soviet Union, all members of the United Nations Security Council.
In this Council, the two main participants in the arms race – the two
superpowers – supplanted their deep ideological divergences and politics
aiming at maintaining the monopoly of nuclear knowledge. This policy,
based on the argument that the proliferation of this knowledge would
doubtless lead to the development of nuclear weapons, according to them,
the accelerated multiplication of new centers of power and the increase of
potential danger of starting an arms race that fatally would result in the
outbreak of generalized nuclear war.
In the post-war
period a series of initiatives were started aiming at handling the
sensitive problem created by the growing scientific and technical
mastering of the atomic nucleus, limiting it as far as possible. On one
hand, it was tried to negotiate means and modes of ending the arms race.
This question, which still is the core of the present international issue,
had a relative success. In fact, the military expenditure of the two
opposing blocks, which divided nations, continued to grow astronomically
and reached values above US$ 1 trillion annually (dollars of 1955). On the
other hand, it is true that various initiatives were launched to promote
international agreements in order to avoid nuclear proliferation.
As a result, the
Atoms for Peace program was launched in 1953 through which the United
States would supply to other countries only research nuclear reactors. In
spite of the small size and the strictly peaceful character of these
equipments, they were submitted to strict supplier control.
In order to
complement and amplify such restriction, in October 2, 1956, inspired by
those counties and supported by the international community, it was
established the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with
headquarters in Vienna. Besides the mentioned objective, it would have the
mandate to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy for the overall
benefit. Its organizing committee was headed by the then Brazilian
Ambassador Luiz Carlos Bernardes.
The Agency, in
spite of the fact that it became a useful and important negotiating forum
for alleviating East/West tensions, soon became an international
instrument of a safeguards system that in fact made it difficult the
generalization of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This attitude was
contrary to the spirit that motivated its creation. To further aggravate
this framework and with the agreement of the industrialized countries, the
basic Agency’s regulation was revised in order to prevent the financing of
capital goods which are indispensable, as we know, to implement nuclear
programs exclusively dedicated to electric energy production in countries
that have neither the capital nor the sophisticated industrial base
required for this production. The safeguards system, in whose amplified
formulation the present author participated in 1962-1963 as representative
of Brazil, has established an international control over nuclear products,
processes and information to be interchanged in the multilateral and
bilateral levels; it has also generated the “contamination” concept of any
component, even the most conventional ones, that were part of
installations submitted to the safeguard regime. For this purpose, the
IAEA created an international complex inspection system to guarantee the
applications of its requirements.
The
industrialized countries, led by the members of the atomic club, not
satisfied with Vienna´s Agency actions, have proposed in 1968 the Non
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that would require from its signatories the
proscription in their countries of all activities that might in any way
give rise to military applications (Note 5). This
engagement includes the reinforcement of international inspections of all
installations of IAEA countries members, except those countries that have
nuclear weapons.
This mechanism
has been gradually amplified through the so-called Additional Protocols to
the safeguards agreements, and therefore the NPT itself, by the IAEA
General Conference, the highest body of this organization, subordinated to
the UN Security Council.
The proponents
of the Treaty offered to the eventual signatories of this diplomatic
agreement the advantageous amplification of access to atomic peaceful
applications and, as a counterpart, promotion of their own disarmament.
These “advantages” were illusory since they were never completely
effective except belatedly and timidly through celebrated partial
disarmament agreements signed by the two superpowers and that were
partially abrogated by the Bush administration and maintained in the
present administration of the remaining superpower (Note 6).
Besides those
instruments, it was established in the ambit of Latin America and
Caribbean in 1967 the Tlatelolco Treaty, precursor of NPT, to promote the
proscription of atomic weapons in this area. This Treaty was involved in
ups and downs not only in the countries of the region and the five
components of the UN Security Council as well as countries that have
territories under their tutelage in the area. During a long period France
and Cuba did not sign it; Argentina did not ratify it. The big powers
signed it with unacceptable reserves: the United States and England
reserved the right to transport arms in the region and the Soviet Union
and China did not agree. Furthermore, the United States and the Soviet
Union conditioned the compliance with this diplomatic instrument (that
allowed carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes) to the
possibility of the development of methods to distinguish between these
explosions and those with military objectives. As it is known, this option
of nuclear explosions, called pacific ones, did not prosper with the ban
in October 1963, through an international agreement, of nuclear artifacts
tests, pacific or military.
The
Tlatelolco Treaty in practice
became inoperative until finally amendments proposed by Argentina, Brazil
and Chile to be included in it principles, contained in the general
inspection regime of the IAEA, which permitted its definitive
ratification, inclusive by Brazil, through the Decree 1.246, of September
16, 1994.
It should be
noticed that the countries that have technology have promulgated national
legislations that are more restrictive than the existing ones regarding
technology transfer. These restrictions, as we know, are difficult to be
implemented and they were gradually extended to space, chemical and
biological technologies (the so-called dual technologies).
Nevertheless,
the uncontrolled arms race went on until the end of the 1990s,
characteristic of the Cold War, when it was installed the denominated
East-West terror balance that lasted until the relative détente that
followed, particularly at the end of the Vietnam War (1972). It was later
intensified by the dismantling of the Soviet Union which permitted the
achievement of various agreements between it and the USA for stopping, as
we have mentioned, experiments with nuclear bombs both in the atmosphere
and underground. Moreover this permitted the progressive dismantling, even
though partial, of intercontinental ballistic missiles by the Salt I and
Salt II Treaties, signed in February 1971 and September 1996. In this date
the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed by 155 countries but not by India,
Pakistan and North Korea. On the other hand, Israel did not adhere to the
NPT of July 1968, as well as India and Pakistan.
With the end of
the Cold War it was expected that the bipolar power system would eliminate
the huge expenses of the arms race, transferring them to promote general
development. This hope, disappointing the best expectations of the poorer
countries, was frustrated. Instead of it, it was installed a multi-polar
power system presently including nine nuclear countries: United States,
England, Russia, China, Pakistan, India, Israel, France and North Korea,
all of them characterized by the most different and conflicting political
and religious visions.
The
international conjuncture is dangerously aggravated particularly in the
Middle East where the intention assigned to Iran (with violation of the
NPT, of which it is signatory), namely that it is trying to develop
nuclear weapons, could generate a conflict that would overstep the region
and reach catastrophic proportions. It is reminiscent of the crisis
generated in October 1963 by the installation in Cuba of the medium range
missiles with nuclear warheads that dangerously made the world come close
to thermonuclear war with unpredictable consequences.
In this context
it is exemplary and up-to-date the agreement between Brazil and Argentina
regarding the promotion of mutual inspection of their nuclear activities.
It was suggested by the report “Evaluation of the Brazilian Nuclear
Program” of 1986, and that motivated the creation of the
Brazilian-Argentine Agency of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
(ABACC) (ref 17); see also on
the subject
Notes 5
and 6. This
bi-national Agency was established in December 12, 1991 when its first
secretary took office, the Argentinean Jorge Coll who signed in the
following day in Vienna the Quadripartite Agreement including Brazil,
Argentina, IAEA and ABACC. This Agreement established a safeguards regime
in the two countries which was analogous to that in force in the countries
that have adhered to the NPT. In the following five years there was a
series of discussions and meetings to evaluate the nuclear capacity of the
two countries while ABACC already applied safeguards in all installations
of the two countries, including the military ones. The Brazilian
ratification of the Quadripartite Agreement was endorsed by the
legislative Decree 11 of February 9, 1994 and it was regulated by the
Presidential Decree 1.065 on February 24 of the same year.
In spite of its
reticence regarding the discriminatory character of the NPT due to the
reasons already presented, Brazil finally supported the Treaty and
ratified it in 1997 even though it had already included in its Federal
Constitution of 1988 an item that excluded the use of nuclear energy for
military purposes.
The importance
attained by nuclear energy can be presently evaluated by the operation of
442 nuclear power plants in 300 countries, with installed capacity of 369
GWe, as shown in Graphic XI – representing about 15% of electric energy
generated in the world.
Therefore, it is
justified the development of an independent nuclear program in order to
create technology with a future, following the directives for the sector
by the National Security Council. According to these directives, the
Federal Administration, as already mentioned, will choose under the
present circumstances natural uranium as the most adequate fuel for our
future power plants.
This option was
based on pioneering experiences in England (installation of the Calder
Hall reactor, with 100MW) and in France (plants of Chinon, with the same
power, in the Loire Valley). The choice was the best one for our country
not only at the technical level but also at the political one. In fact,
France, that was aware of its independence and that was eager to return to
the prestige and leadership it had in nuclear research in the pre-war
period (it had even applied for the patent of the technical conception of
nuclear reactors which would be developed by Fermi in 1941) had ignored,
like Brazil, the barriers to technology transfer, even for civil use,
created by the IAEA. That country was willing to cooperate closely with
our country to develop nuclear power plants of the mentioned type. The
Working Group on Power Reactors (GTRP), already mentioned, intended to
develop a complete 100 MW reactor project with the participation of high
level French technicians.
The cooperation
comprehensively included all sectors of the program. Besides the technical
areas, an intense scientific interchange among Brazilian and French
institutions took place (involving the Nuclear Study Center of Grenoble
and the National Laboratory of Saclay, in Paris). This cooperation,
developed mainly between 1961 and 1979, had the participation of eminent
French scientific personalities. As already mentioned, the director of
Saclay, Jean Debiesse, the Grenoble CEN director, Pierre Balligand, later
member of the French Atomic Energy Commission, Michel Soutif, Chancellor
of the University of Grenoble followed by a one-year sojourn in UFMG of
professor André Moussa, head of the Nuclear Chemistry Laboratory, of
Daniel Dautreppe, head of Division of Fundamental Studies, and of Pierre
Servoz-Gavin, head of the Magnetic Resonance Laboratory. During one year
we had the collaboration of CNRS’s physicist André Baudry as well as that
of the young researchers Paul Vuillet, Pierre Boyer, Alan Chappe,
Christian Jeandey, besides Madame Pierrette Auric.
The political
and economic instability that materialized in Brazil and the change in the
framework of our international relationships, caused by the 1964 coup
d’état, have interrupted this process of French technology appropriation.
It should be remembered that both France and England have abandoned at
that time the natural uranium-gas-graphite reactor type because those
countries have decided to build nuclear submarines whose propulsion needed
the American technology of reactors fuelled with enriched uranium and
moderated and cooled by pressurized water.
6.
The Thorium
Group
From 1965 to
1973, due to the non-definition by the federal authorities regarding the
reactor type to be adopted for the Nuclear Program and due to the natural
uranium line left behind by England and France, our major partner, it was
created at IPR the so called Thorium
Group. The original conception of this group was to use thorium, which
is abundant in our country, associated with uranium, for producing
independently electric energy. A reference project was developed for a
30MW reactor fuelled with natural uranium and thorium and heavy water.
This project would permit the elaboration of three other options: the
Instinto Project, developed in
1966/1967 (enriched uranium – thorium – heavy water); the
Toruna
Project, from 1968 to 1971(natural uranium and heavy water) and
finally, from 1971 to 1973 there was also the
Pluto Project (plutonium – thorium – heavy water). These concepts
and projects are described in three International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) publications. The first one,
Thorium-cycle
possibilities in the Brazilian nuclear program (ref 18), the second
one, “The INSTINTO Project – A status and progress report on the thorium
reactor development program” (ref 19) and, finally,
the third one, “Preliminary assessment of
heavy-water thorium reactors in the Brazilian Nuclear Program” (ref 20).
These studies
had the support of the Atomic Energy agencies of France, Germany, Sweden
and the participation of members from the Institute of Nuclear Engineering
(IEN) in Rio de Janeiro, through the engineers Luiz Osório de Brito Aghina
and J.A. Nóbrega, in reactor physics, and J. Ribeiro da Costa, in
structural engineering. In Saclay, França, there was the participation of
the engineer Ricardo B. Pinheiro, from IPR’s Thorium Group, in the staff
headed by Roger Naudet and composed of Marcel Chabrillac, Annick Boivineau
and S. Goldstein.
It should be
pointed out the interest of France regarding the resume of nuclear
cooperation with Brazil demonstrated by the visit to our country of a
French delegation headed by André Giraud, important member of the Atomic
Energy Commission of that country. I participated in that mission invited
by the Brazilian government as group leader of research at the Grenoble
Center of Nuclear Studies where I worked from 1965 to 1972. The delegation
aimed at negotiating not only future work with the Thorium Group but also
the use of electric energy, available through the Itaipu project, for
uranium enrichment using gaseous diffusion technology to be supplied by
France (Note 7). A memento of
this visit is shown in the photograph below (Figure 2).
Figure 2 – Visit of André Giraud to
the Thorium Project.
I also remember
with pleasure and gratitude the role played by the Director of the
Grenoble Center of Nuclear Studies, Mister Pierre Balligand, shown in
Figure 3.
Figure 3 -
Pierre Balligand, Director of the Grenoble Center of Nuclear Studies
His relationship
with Brazil has started through the IAEA of which he was Deputy General
Director and that were extended beyond Grenoble where he was Commissioner
for Technical-Scientific Diversification of the Atomic Energy Commission.
The Minas Gerais
group had also the assistance of professors Borisas Cimbleris (thermal
engineering) and J. Z. F. Diniz (structural engineering). In the ambit of
the project were installed a Subcritical Unit (Capitu) and others for
studying the thermal behavior of the fuel elements and of components to be
eventually developed. Calculation programs were also developed for
calculations necessary for the above mentioned technical options.
It should be
mentioned that since thorium is not a fissile element (except using high
energy neutrons), that is, it is transmutable into uranium 233 by capture
of thermal neutrons (followed by beta decay), it was evident that the
success of the thorium project would need, for the execution of the three
chosen alternatives, the previous existence of a power reactor fuelled by
natural uranium or enriched uranium with appropriate power estimated in
30MW. In the case of plutonium, a transuranium element, it would be
necessary to separate it from irradiated uranium or use it directly, in
situ, after bombarding uranium238 with neutrons.
The difficulties
of obtaining the considerable investments regarding financial and
equipment resources as well as technical capacity needed to implement the
above mentioned phases and the lack of the indispensable support from the
Federal Government brought the project to an end. It involved the active
participation of 20 young engineers from IPR, listed in
Note 8.
This approach
did not interest the main nuclear energy generation countries, except
India which has no uranium reserves and has sustained in the last half
century research on the thorium cycle. As it is well known, the success of
this line implies the availability of enriched uranium that was until
recently not accessible to this country. The recent signature of an
India-United States agreement permits India to circumvent this obstacle
that it has faced since 1951 and the country has decided to build a
regenerating reactor using the thorium cycle and moderated by heavy water
and it will construct a large number of reactors called fast reactors to
produce electricity and generate uranium 233 as well (ref 21).
China, on the
other hand, has chosen, among the most important projects relative to
Scientific and Technological Development, to launch a program of a molten
salt thorium cycle reactor. According to studies carried out by the Oak
Ridge National Laboratory (ref 21), this type of
reactor will produce energy at low cost with safety, efficiency and
sustainability. According to the above referred site, the Chinese research
and development project is cheaper than the technology adopted in India (ref 22). Recent
comparisons of thorium and uranium cycles have recently been made by the
English Department of Energy and Climate Change (ref 23). These facts
should induce the Brazilian government to resume the studies started in
the 1960s by the Institute of Radioactive Research (IRD) aiming at, at
least, to follow the most important mentioned initiatives and naturally
taking into account that our country has the 6th world reserve
according to a survey carried out by the "World Nuclear Association”, as
shown in Table 9 (Assured World Reserves of thorium).
It should be
observed that several engineers and researchers, who had left IPR when
they were transferred to CNEN, have significantly contributed to promote
or consolidate six post-graduation courses at the Minas Gerais Federal
University (UFMG). Furthermore, some who have left IPR were assigned
relevant functions in different important programs of the federal and
state administration (Note 9), such as the
Industrial Quality Program and the alcohol engine.
Until 2006 these
courses have graduated 1,043 MSc and 399 PhD, considering only the
Chemistry, Physics and Nuclear Science and Techniques sectors. Analogous
experiences must have occurred in other institutions illustrating the
important catalytic role of state-of-the-art technologies regarding the
preparation of high level human resources.
The evolution of
the technical-scientific production of the Institute is shown in Graphics
I, II and III in IPR; IV in CDTN; V and VI in IPEN; VII, VIII and IX in
the Institutes of CNEN. In Graphic III are presented pulses in the
cumulative growth of the published studies obtained by the derivate of its
growth curve.
Graphic
I - Cumulative number of studies published by IPR (1953 - 1972).
Graphic
II - Logistic treatment of the technical-scientific evolution of
IPR production between 1953 and 1972
Graphic
III – Pulse analysis of the logistic treatment of the
technical-scientific evolution by IPR between 1953 and 1972.
Graphic
IV – Cumulative number of studies published by CDTN (1973-2005).
Graphic
V – Cumulative number of studies published by IPEN (1958 - 2005).
Graphic
VI – Logistic treatment of technical-scientific production
evolution of IPEN between 1958 and 2005
Graphic
VII – Cumulative number of studies published by IEN/CNEN, 1958 –
2005
Graphic
VIII - Logistic treatment of technical-scientific production
evolution of IEN/CNEN 1958 – 2005
Graphic
IX - Logistic treatment of technical-scientific production
evolution of IEN/CNEN 1958 - 1979
They clearly
indicate maximum productivity in 1960, 1964 and 1970 followed by notable
decrease corresponding respectively to concentration of efforts on
assembling and inauguration of the Triga reactor in 1960, and to the
negative effect of the military coup in 1964, corroborated by the dramatic
decrease of scientific production after that event. It is also noted the
effect of transferring IPR to CBTN (CNEN) as well as of the dissolution of
the Thorium Group afterwards. All these graphics were obtained by
applying the modeling developed by Marchetti and frequently used in
studies of the present author (ref 24).
It is worthwhile
to remember that the experience gained by the Thorium Group would be used
later in the project of the experimental fuel element construction using
thorium and uranium in cooperation with German technicians in the ambit of
the agreement with the former Federal Republic of Germany.
It should be
mentioned that in 1966 the President General, H. Castelo Branco, through
the Decree Law 200 has subordinated CNEN to the Ministry of Mines and
Energy, removing it from the Presidency and consequently reducing its
political status. I remember that I have immediately protested against
this measure in a telegram sent to the president of the Republic.
As a consequence
of this new subordination, it was created at the Ministry of Mines and
Energy a working group composed of CNEN, Eletrobras and Furnas
representatives that recommended the construction of a 500MWe reactor.
This recommendation was adopted by the New National Nuclear Energy Policy
of the Costa e Silva administration. In spite of the treatment received by
the Thorium Group from the government, it was decided to engage all
existing technical personnel at all levels, including those who were
abroad. For this purpose, Ambassador Sérgio Corrêa da Costa was
responsible for maintaining contact with the then “exiled” scientists.
7. Agreement with the United
States and construction of Angra I. Establishment of CBTN and Nuclebrás.
Agreement with Germany.
The first
contacts with Germany were started at the time of the visit of Chancellor
Willy Brandt to Brazil when it was agreed that the two countries would
execute a scientific-technological cooperation.
These
understandings as well as the projected measures were frustrated at the
end of the Costa e Silva administration. Instead of the participation of
the scientific community, including those who were abroad, new and violent
repression measures were applied and the sector was deeply modified from
1970 to 1974. The Brazilian Company of Nuclear Technology (CBTN) was
established, a new enterprise that should implement the program of the new
policy. All institutes, except IPEN, an autarchy of USP, were absorbed by
CBTN by a decree and IPR gained a new denomination (Note 10).
The Cooperation
Agreement with the United States was revised in July 17, 1972 and a new
diplomatic instrument was then specifically referred as “Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Energy”.
CBTN naturally
changed the research programs of the institutes, the
Thorium Group, as we have mentioned, was extinguished and
contradictorily it was decided to increase studies about the possibility
of participation of the Brazilian industry in the construction of a 500
MWE power plant, suggested by the previous administration. Specifications
regarding this purpose were distributed for the construction of this plant
in Angra dos Reis. At the same time an international bidding process was
opened and Empresa Brasileira de Engenharia became responsible for
equipment assembly; Gibbs & Hill (USA) and Promon Engenharia (Brazil) were
responsible for elaborating the project. Civil works would be carried out
by Norberto Odebrecht.
This power plant
of 625 MW would be fuelled by natural uranium since – it was then
considered – would be impossible to reach in the near future autonomy in
Brazil regarding the fuel cycle; Brazil would depend on foreign fuel
supply and therefore, it was vulnerable.
It became clear
that the adopted policy was contrary to all disposition of implanting an
independent fuel cycle, established in 1946.
The governmental
decision which had announced that the construction of the Angra Power
Plant was a fundamental instrument for technology transfer was also
frustrated. The national participation was limited to only 6% of the plant
final cost, even though its installation had permitted considerable
experience assimilation by our technicians, mainly concerning operation
security. Regretfully, this decision isolated and discouraged the
considerable human potential in our research institutes and universities.
The recognized
limitations during the Angra I construction, due first to dubious nature
of the project itself, the technique shown in similar power plants then
installed in other countries; the inexperience regarding the sector
management, as well as other factors pointed out in reference (16), caused
a long delay in the plant construction which started operation only in
1983.
The end of the
Médici administration coincided with the first oil crisis – the cost of a
barrel jumped from US$ 3.88 to US$12.55 – and large increase of
electricity demand.
The acuteness of
the energy crisis that then erupted (the installed power was 17.4 GW) led
the new administration to adopt different measures not only to reduce our
external energy dependency – mainly oil – but also to explore national
alternative sources, particularly hydroelectricity and the use of biomass
(start of the Alcohol Program).
From 1975 to
1983 new projects were launched: Tucuruí, Foz de Areia, Salto Osório,
Salto Santiago and São Félix, besides the Candiota coal plant, totaling
about 9GW to which it should be added the bi-national Itaipu with 12.6 MW
of installed power. These measures have more than doubled the installed
power left by the previous administration.
In fact, de
energy situation in 1975 was characterized by a continuous increase of
electricity consumption which reached 10.2% and 18.2% annually,
respectively, in the two subsequent years. The installed generation
capacity increased from 19.5 GW, in 1975, to 21GW, in 1976.
Certainly it was
the expectation of this really much accelerated electricity demand growth
rate as well as our high external energy dependence that led the
government to sign the agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. In
fact, the energy dependence of our country can be evaluated by the imports
of 300 million oil barrels in 1977 that reached, according to estimates
then made, 313 million barrels in 1978 compared to the national production
of only 61 million barrels annually.
Projections of
the electric energy then made estimated that it should reach 50 GW from
nuclear origin in 2005. This objective, should it have been reached, would
increase the participation of nuclear energy in the electric system to
about 71%, practically approaching the Brazilian situation to the present
nuclear participation in the French generation system, which is the most
important in the world!
Cooperation with
Germany started with the Brasília Protocol, signed in October 3, 1974, and
it was formalized by the Bonn agreement which would guide the relationship
between the two countries regarding the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
The agreement would cover all phases of nuclear technology development
from mining to the construction of power plants each one generating 1.35
GW. Surprisingly, the organizational structure adopted by NUCLEBRAS, in
December 16, 1974, before the signature of the agreement between the two
countries, was organized in such a way as to satisfy in all details the
various German enterprises that would participate in the implementation of
the program.
The different
enterprises that were then structured had variable capital composition.
NUCLAM, for mineral exploitation, had 51’% of national capital; NUCLEN,
for engineering project and service, 75%; NUCLEP, for development project
execution, fabrication and commercialization of heavy components, 98.2%;
NUCLEI, for enriched uranium production, 75%.
In the last
case, since uranium enrichment technology transfer to Brazil has been
blocked by intervention of England, partner of Germany and Holland in the
company that produced this material – URENCO -, it was chosen the
development of a new technology called “jet nozzle”, still very incipient.
Several enterprises that were responsible for specific sectors joined
NUCON in the construction of the power plants that was until then reserved
to Furnas Centrais Elétricas, subsidiary of ELETROBRÁS.
NUCON was
deactivated by the Decree No 90.398, in November 7 de 1984, due
to conflicts that arose between the traditional electric sector and
NUCLEBRÁS.
The extremely
complex structure of NUCLEBRÁS aimed at, according to their administrators
at the time, guaranteeing the technical responsibility and the effective
technology transfer by the German partner in each phase of the Program.
According to the Program, the enterprises association would also make
viable the growing inflow of foreign capital consistent with the needs of
the NUCLEBRAS holding activity.
The Brasília
Protocol created the expectation, and even the certitude, of the Brazilian
authorities that the extremely ambitious program would be totally executed
since it was based on the hypothesis of national electric energy demand
growth so that it would be necessary to construct at least 9 nuclear power
plants of 1.35 GW until 1990.
In fact, even
before the FRG Agreement was signed, the Presidency of the Republic had
already approved in June 3, 1974 the Explanatory Statement Nº
300 by the Minister of Mines
and energy authorizing the construction of the second unit of the
“Almirante Álvaro Alberto” Power Plant followed by the Decree of June 13,
1975, determining the construction of a third unit with 1.35 GW (Angra
III).
Concerning the
construction terms, it was considered that Angra II would be ready in 5.5
years, contrary to the international experience accumulated in countries
more developed than Brazil, whose referred terms were rarely reduced to
less than 8 or 10 years. As it is known, Agra II was ready in 2000, 23
years after its start in 1977!
The Brazilian
Nuclear Program evaluation, from its start until 1986, was carried out by
a Presidential Commission created by the Decree Nº 91,606 of September 2,
1985. It was chaired by the present author and its composition is
described in
Note 11.
It was verified
that, contrary to the forecasts at the time concerning the construction of
the Angra II e Angra III power plants, different factors would prevent
complying with the originally established chronogram.
First of all,
the growth rate of both of the GDP and the energy demand was gradually
reduced under the impact of the serious crisis in the balance of payments
in Brazil due to the acute disturbance in the international economy,
intensified by the second oil crisis in 1979. This crisis lasted for the
subsequent 20 years resulting in the almost zero growth of the Brazilian
economy.
It should be
remembered that, concurrently with the Nuclear Program, big projects were
started in 1974 in the energy sector as well as in other sectors (Itaipu
and Tucuruí, already mentioned; Steel Railway, Açominas, Transamazonic
Road, etc.), that had to compete with the nuclear sector regarding the use
of internal and mainly external resources that became more and more
scarce. These projects, financed with substantial external interests, have
contributed to dramatically increasing the Brazilian external debt, a
problem that Brazil has faced until recently. That is why in 2005 the
Brazilian GDP growth was the second worst of Latin America after that of
Haiti.
Besides those
very important factors, the problems raised with Angra II’s foundations
due to its localization, geologically problematic, have caused initial
delays relative to the evaluated chronogram, namely 3.5 years. In fact the
power plant was inaugurated in February 2000.
It should be
mentioned that similar problems have already occurred in other countries
and this experience was not applied here causing disagreement regarding
technical standards applicable to the plant’s foundation. The localization
of the construction site itself, as already mentioned, produced all kinds
of managerial difficulties, notably in the relationship between Furnas and
the civil works contractors on one side and Furnas, NUCLEBRÁS and CNEN on
the other side. The latter, as it is known, was legally responsible for
the safety of the power plant and therefore for the licensing of its
construction, following for this purpose the American standards, not
connected with the project which was entirely developed according to the
basic philosophy of German norms, much more empirical and flexible that
that adopted by CNEN.
Regarding Angra
III, as generally known, in spite of the acquisition of 45% of the
equipment and commitments concerning 35% of the remaining equipment,
corresponding to US$ 750 million, it was estimated in 1986 that the total
cost would reach about US$ 2.8 billion, including the financial costs. The
lack of decision about the conclusion of this plant had as a consequence
expenditures of about US$ 20 million annually (excluding financial costs)
only for maintenance and conservation of the stored equipment.
It is estimated
that should the decision of constructing Angra be made today, the plant
would be completed in six years, that is, in 2012. For this purpose it
would be necessary an additional injection of US$1.8 billion.
The de facto
interruption of the program caused, for example, idle capacity in NUCLEP
except for certain services outside its purpose. Similar end had
NUCLEBRAs’ Reprocessing Unit, whose construction cost from 1986 on would
reach about US$ 240 million. The fuel element plant started in 1977 in
Rezende is operating partially. The originally conceived project involved
three steps – fuel element assembly, reconversion of uranium hexafluoride
to uranium dioxide (UO2) and fabrication of pellets containing
enriched uranium. In this plant it was assembled the first recharge of
Angra I as well as some subsequent loads of this plant and those of Angra
II. From the pilot plant in IPEN for conversion of UF6 into UO2,
it was installed in Aramar, in a larger scale, part of the so called
Parallel Program.
In spite of the
different difficulties pointed out regarding the establishment of the
Program, various important research and development projects were carried
out both at IPEN and CDTN. Studies relative to conversion, already
mentioned, and to isotopic enrichment using the jet nozzle method were
carried out at CDTN. The two institutes (CDTN and IPEN) were also involved
in projects relative to construction of research reactors. The first one
was involved with the production of zirconium (without hafnium), an
important component for the fuel elements cladding. In engineering and
project management, NUCLEN has developed considerable competence.
It is worthwhile
to remember that different other projects, particularly those relative to
the development of prototype fuels using thorium and uranium, and thorium
and plutonium (where the plutonium oxide is substituted for cerium oxide,
its isomorphic, in the experimental development of fuel model) were
developed by CDTN in cooperation with different German groups. The first
fuel element (thorium-enriched uranium) was designed for both Angra I and
Angra II and tested in Germany (it should be remembered that due to the
refuse of the United States to supply fuel for Angra I, the German
partner, using enriched uranium from URENCO, fabricated the fuel elements
for both Angra I and Angra II. Loading of these two reactors still depends
on enriched uranium from the same origin, even though it is viable to
fabricate them in the Resende Plant).
The performance
of the new element containing thorium was not effectively used in our
reactors due to the essentially political objection raised by Furnas
Centrais Elétricas responsible for the management of the reactors.
According to
Ricardo Pinheiro’s account, the documentation of these experiments,
carried out successfully through the German-Brazilian cooperation, has
been dispersed. It is necessary to gather this documentation in order to
resume the experiments mainly those regarding the stimulation for using
thorium and consequently increase our energy sources reserves. Besides,
this would raise the possibility of international cooperation regarding
the use of thorium with countries like India that have important reserves
of this element. According to recent announcement, India has decided to
construct a pioneer breeder reactor using thorium.
It should be
mentioned that cooperation with Germany has permitted a large number of
Brazilian companies to have access to the necessary technology to
construct Angra II with the quality that is indispensable for such
undertaking. The continuation of technology transfer to the industrial
sector as well as to other sectors after 1986 was described by Dr. Witold
Lepecki.
Various projects
were also developed for nuclear fusion along the past years with the
support of CNEN in the Universities of Campinas, Federal Fluminense, São
Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, Brasília and in the National Institute of
Spatial Research (INPE), in the Technical Institute of the Air Force
(CTA), in the Military Institute of Engineering (IME), in the Institute of
Nuclear Engineering (IEN) and in the Institute of Energy and Nuclear
Research (IPEN). These activities, even though incipient ones, were
resumed mainly in the Brazilian Center of Physics Research under the
leadership of Ricardo Galvão, due to the new interest on this technology
in projects in cooperation with Cadarache, France.
Regarding
personnel training, considerable efforts were made in the ambit of the
Pró-Nuclear program to which were allocated US$ 66 million in 1973. The
number of people directly involved has reached in 1986 8,669 employees:
3,054 had higher education of which 509 had M.Sc. degree and 167 had Ph.D.
degree. As already mentioned, in spite of the interruption of power plant
construction the research institutes continued to play an important role
in the development of radioisotopes applications in nuclear medicine,
agriculture and engineering of materials. In this context it should be
remembered that the six post-graduation courses of UFMG created from the
1970s on has formed a high number of M.Sc.’s and Ph.D.’s. As an example,
the Chemistry, Physics and Nuclear Techniques areas produced 399 Ph.D.’s
and 1,043 M.Sc.’s until 2006.
The efforts made
in the three institutes of the nuclear area, including the Institute of
Radioprotection and Dosimetry can be evaluated by the respective
scientific production previously shown in Graphics I to IX.
8. The Parallel
Nuclear Program
As already
pointed out, the fuel cycle is, so to speak, the soul of any independent
nuclear program. The promise of complete technology transfer in this area,
which would be made by the nuclear agreement with the Federal Republic of
Germany, was frustrated due to the impossibility of transferring to Brazil
(or jointly to be developed in our country) the ultra-centrifugation
technique for enriching uranium. It is clear that using enriched uranium
as fuel not only for Angra I and Angra II but also for the 9 reactors that
would be built in the frame of the German-Brazilian cooperation would
require from our country efforts for the indigenous development of this
cutting-edge technology. Furthermore, the jet nozzle technology that was
offered was not only incipient at that time of the agreement but according
to (theoretical) analysis it consumed too much energy and it is too
expensive now. On the other, its practical execution in pilot scale in
CDTN was never carried out because financial resources were not available.
In these
circumstances, IPEN, in cooperation with engineers of the National Navy,
under the leadership of Dr. Othon Pinheiro da Silva, started from 1978 on
the development of the ultracentrifugation technology for producing fuel
to feed submarines with nuclear propulsion. This enrichment project was a
technological success and it is described in the nº 54 issue of the
Economy and Energy periodical (ref 25). The success
of this undertaking is a major conquest of the Brazilian technology that
will permit, when the development of our nuclear program will be resumed,
the desired national independence regarding the fuel cycle.
The vital
strategic character of mastering the fuel cycle was demonstrated when the
Carter administration refused in 1977 to supply enriched uranium for Angra
I, a reactor fabricated by Westinghouse. This fact has created a crisis
that was overcome by the agreement with Germany that permitted not only to
supply uranium enriched by Urenco but also developed the fabrication of
fuel elements for Angra I by KWU. This technology as well as that used for
producing fuel elements for Angra II was transferred to the national
Nuclear Fuel Plant in Resende.
The recent
installation of two ultra-centrifugation units in that fuel elements plant
by the Ministry of Science and Technology is auspicious since it
represents the first step for resuming the activities of the sector that
has been virtually suspended in spite of the pressing need to resume them.
9. The National Energy
Matrix and the Thermal Generation to Complement the Hydroelectric Park.
The probable
future of thermonuclear energy in Brazil is analyzed in a recent document
of the National Energy Plan (ref 26). In this
document different alternatives, particularly those relative to the future
thermal complement (nuclear or not) to hydroelectric generation, that
represents 285 TWh, that is, 10.7 % of the potential of the country that
is technically recoverable (2003 data).
The internal
energy supply between 1971 and 2002 reached the annual average rate of
6.4%; the share of nuclear energy in the electric internal supply was only
9.5 TWh in 2005, equivalent to 2.2% of the total.
In 2005 the
hydroelectricity was responsible for 340.5 TWh, that is 77.1% of the
total; 8.3% of hydroelectricity were imported, the remaining part had
thermal origin.
These results
should be compared with the consumption of 270 TWh foreseen by the author
through modeling described in the nº 45 issue of the
Economy and Energy periodical (ref 27). The forecast
made in 1988 is shown in Figure 20 of reference 28. The hydroelectric
share in the future national generation that is assumed to be much higher
than the present one should be carefully examined according to the article
A “Destination Port” for the Brazilian Electric System” (ref 49).
It should be
remembered that:
1º) the
Brazilian electricity generation system is characterized by its
continental dimension and by the strong predominance of hydro generation;
2º) the
dimension of Brazil has created the expectation that seasonal differences
among the various regions are complementary, guaranteeing the comfortable
expansion of the hydroelectric system;
3º) based on 70
years of rainfall statistics, it is shown that it is possible to develop a
very simple modeling for each region separately, except for the South
region that has an unpredictable behavior;
4º) the
hypothesis that there is no inexhaustible hydrous reserve available at any
time in the Amazon region is highly arguable since it has the longest dry
season of the various regions.
The study also
focuses the drastic reduction of hydraulic energy stock of our reservoirs
(dams) that has decreased from two years to six months presently.
This situation
makes it indispensable to use thermal generation to complement hydro
electric generation.
Among the
existing options, the use of fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas) is increasingly
more inconvenient due to its contribution to the greenhouse effect.
Excluding the possibility of a larger share of biomass energy, the
contribution of this source presents problems of competition in the use of
soil and also, in some cases, seasonal problems except for sugarcane whose
bagasse is used to generate electricity in the inter-harvest period.
The relative
participation of the different sources of primary energy, described by
Marchetti in 1985 and updated until 2005 by Carlos Feu, is shown in
Graphic X (ref 26) where it can
be noticed that after a too fast growth of nuclear energy, its demand will
follow a slower rhythm in the next years (reaching the share of 17% in
2030).
Graphic X –
Share of Primary Energy Sources in World Consumption: (a) until 1985 and
(b) updated
The present
situation regarding the use of this energy has accelerated from 1965 on,
however it has decreased in 1970s, as shown in Graphic XI.
Graphic XI
–Nuclear Energy in the World: Installed Nuclear Generation
The present
participation of nuclear energy in the world electricity generation is
close to 15.5%; Marchetti’s forecast has limited it to 17% in 2030 and
predicts that the future participation of this energy would be modest even
considering the considerable inertial growth of this source at that time.
In what concerns Brazil, this participation would reach 5% in that year
corresponding to 18.9 GW, according to Table I from reference (24).
Table I
–Installed Capacity of Electricity Production by Public Service Plants
It can be
concluded that in any hypothesis, hydro electricity will continue to have
a dominant participation in the national energy matrix considering the
available potential estimated in 265 GW which is regionally distributed in
a regular form as shown in Figure III. In this figure it is also presented
the two growth rates foreseen for 2030 according to the hypothesis of GDP
of 3.8% annually (high) and 3.0% annually (low), respectively, in this
period. The annual growth of the installed potential would then be 4.2%
and 3.1%.
Figure II –
Hydroelectricity in Brazil and its planned growth (Plan 2030).
In conclusion, I want to emphasize the fundamental
importance of two problems that have not been solved and which affect the
nuclear sector as a whole. The first one concerns the accelerated loss of
human resources that were trained along the program not only because of
“Pró-Nuclear” but also those who afterwards have followed university
graduation courses in the area. Aging of technical personnel and non offer
of jobs as consequence of no substantial nuclear activity indicates a
situation of intolerable waste.
It should be remembered that until 1986 the
Committee for Evaluation of the Brazilian Nuclear Program has checked that
US$ 4.200 billion
were invested in the sector, excluding the financial costs, which would
reach US$ 1.800 million concerning only the nuclear power plants, if their
foreseen chronogram would have been followed. In
Note 12
it is reproduced
Tables I, II and III of the mentioned report (ref 17).
No comments.
It should be also emphasized that the nuclear safety
question is affected by the fact that the organ that licenses and inspects
all activities – CNEN – is contradictorily also responsible for the
execution of current activities not only in its own laboratories and
connected industries but also for activities that involve nuclear
radiation in the whole country. This dangerous practice that has been
denounced along the years, particularly by the Committee for Evaluation of
the Brazilian Nuclear Program, has not earned the attention it requires.
So, the Goiana accident has faded into oblivion and similarly the
necessary duplication and maintenance of the Rio-São Paulo road,
indispensable for the evacuation of the Angra dos Reis population in case
of accident in the power plants, which cannot be absolutely discarded.
Regarding this issue, the present author, as acting President of the
Brazilian Academy of Sciences has alerted the President of the Republic in
May 1992 to the need of examining this question when it was announced that
the Federal Government planned restructuring the nuclear sector (Annex 2).
In the first Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, the author,
questioned during his visit to the Angra dos Reis plants by the then
Representative Marcondes Perillo, presently Governor of Goiás, has
suggested that the solution to this acute problem would be the adoption of
similar legislation that is in force in Spain. It is evident that the bill
presented by the current Goiás Governor did not pass.
Finally, continuation of Angra III construction
stresses the urgency of resuming the Nuclear Program activities vis-à-vis
the incertitude of unpredictable alterations regarding the cost and
availability of fossil fuels, as the nuclear participation is important
for the thermal complementation of our hydroelectric generation.
It should also be mentioned the importance of
resuming studies concerning the use of thorium for producing nuclear
energy in our country. As it is known, the technology for producing
thorium oxide from monazite sands is completely mastered by Brazil since
the 1950s.
The contribution of Doctors Ricardo Pinheiro, Witold
Lepecki and Sérgio Filgueiras will certainly bring extensive information
about the subject that again is attracting the attention of public
opinion.
A summary of the present article was orally
presented at the initial session of the Francisco Magalhães Gomes
Symposium, organized by the Nuclear Development Center in August 21, 2006.
Even though long, it only summarizes some episodes of the agitated story
of nuclear energy in our country.
10.
Credits
This article was
produce due to the invaluable access to information from CNEN and CDTN
through Drs. Ailton Fernando Dias and Sérgio Almeida Cunha Filgueiras. I
thank professor Ricardo Brant Pinheiro for information regarding certain
aspects of the Thorium Group activities and professors Márcio Quintão
Moreno and Omar Campos Ferreira for careful reading the text and making
frequent corrections; the latter for co-production of Graphic III. I thank
Dr. Carlos Feu Alvim and the Economy and Energy staff for their valuable
suggestions and frequent discussion on the subject. Much of the data used
came from the Report on the Evaluation of the Brazilian Nuclear Program
1986 (ref 16). Bibliographic
information regarding CDTN’s scientific production was kindly gathered by
its librarian Ms. Lenira Santos to whom I am very grateful. I thank
Professor José Domingos Fabris for the information relative to the
scientific production of the ICEX Chemistry Department of UFMG as well as
in the Department of Fundamental Research of the Grenoble Center of
Nuclear Studies, France. I also thank engineer Mateus Vargas Garzon for
making Graphics I, II, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII and IX. Finally I thank
Patrícia Bastos
Leão for her competence and
patience which were inestimable for writing this article.
(1)
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(1896).
(2) H. Hertz, Ann. d. Phys., 31, 983 (1887);
ver também A. l. Hughes e l. A. Du Bridge, Photoelectric Phenomena, McGraw
Hill, New York, (1932).
(3) Goldschmidt, B., Atomic Rivals, Rutgers University
Press, New Brunswick and London, 1990.
(4)
J. Costa Ribeiro em Fernando de Azevedo, As Ciências no Brasil, vol. I,
cap. III, p. 163, Edições Melhoramento, São Paulo, (1955).
(5)
Guimarães, Djalma, Anais da Academia Brasileira de Ciências. I,
n.4,198-200 (1929).
(6)
Othon H. Leonardos em Fernando de Azevedo, As Ciências no Brasil, vol I,
cap VI, p.276, Edições Melhoramento, São Paulo, (1955). Ver também Luiz
Cintra do Prado em “A Radioatividade nas Águas Hidrotermais Brasileiras”,
Escolas Profissionais Salesianas, USP, (1938).
(7) Lattes, C. M. G., Muirhead, H., Occhialini, G. P.
S. and Powell, C. F. Processes involving charged mesons. Nature, 159,
694 - 697, (1947).
(8) Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, Henry De Wolf
Smyth.
Acesso 16, jun, 2006.
http://www.atomicarchive.com/docs/Smith/Report.
(9)
C. V. Dutra, Anais da Escola de Minas de Ouro Preto, 55 (3), 185 –
192, (2002).
(10)
Vargas, J. I., Science in Brazil, Academia Brasileira de Ciências, Rio de
Janeiro, (2000).
(11)
Machado, Ninon, Rev. Dir. Nucl, Rio de Janeiro 3 (2) ,(1981).
(12)
A. Girotto, Rev. Dir. Nucl, Rio de Janeiro, 3 (2): 33 – 37, (1981).
(13)
Forman, John M. A., Rev. Dir. Nucl, Rio de Janeiro, 3 (2): (1981)
(14)
Cordani, U. G.,
Iyer, S. S., Taylor, P. N., Kawashita, K., Sato, K., MCreath, I. ?Pb-Pb,
Rb-Sr and K-Ar
systematics of the Lagoa Real Uranium province (South-central Bahia,
Brazil) and the Espinhaço cycle, Journal of South American Earth
Sciences., v.5, p.33 - 46, 1992.
(15) Lattes, C.M.G., Fugimoto, Y. e Hasegawa, S., Phys.
Report, Phys. Let, 65 (3), (1990).
(16) “Proceedings of a Study Group on the Utilization
of Research Reactors”, São Paulo, 4-8 nov.
(1963).
(17)
Avaliação do Programa Nuclear Brasileiro, Relatório ao Presidente da
República, Brasília, 17, abr, (1986).
(18)
Santos J.C., Brito S.S.
(CNEN), Mello J.C, and Urban C.W.,
(IPR),
“Thorium-cycle possibilities in the Brazilian
nuclear programme”,
in “Utilization
of Thorium Power Reactors”, IAEA, (Technical Reports Series No52). Viena,
(1966).
(19) “The INSTINTO Project – A status and progress
report on the Thorium reactor development program”,
“Staff Report”,
Thorium Group, in Summary report of the meeting “ Working Group on Thorium
Utilization”, IAEA, Viena, 12-14 Dec, (1966).
(20)
Brito, S. Salvio
and Lepecki, W.P.S,
“Preliminary
assessment of heavy-water thorium reactors in the Brazilian Nuclear
programme”, in Symposium
on Heavy-Water Power Reactors, IAEA, Vienna, 11-15 set, (1967).
Proceedings, IAEA, Viena (1968).
(21)
http:nucleargreen.blogspot.com.br/2011//08/indian-and-chinese-development.html,
do dia 23.8.2011
(22) Summary of the Objectives, the Design, and a
Program of Development of Molten -Salt Breeder Reactors, ORNL 851, June
1967
(23) Comparison of Thorium and Uranium Fuel Cycles NNL
(11) 11.593, Issue 5, March 2012 (copyright National Nuclear Lab.Ltd.)
(24)
Vargas J. I.,
The technological prospective: Prediction with a simple mathematical
modeling, Economy & Energy,
45-46, (2004).
(25)
Pinheiro da Silva, Othon e Marques Ferreira, André Luiz, O Enriquecimento
do Urânio no Brasil, Economia & Energia, 54, (2006)
(26)
Geração Termonuclear, Plano Nacional de Energia 2030, Ministério de Minas
e Energia, Brasília, 14 jun, (2006).
(27)
Vargas J.I., A Prospectiva Tecnológica: previsão com um simples modelo
matemático, Economia e Energia, 45, p. 24, 2005. e Gráfico V do
presente trabalho, devido a Carlos Feu Alvim e J. I. Vargas.
(28)
Vargas J. I., “The Brazilian Energy Scenario and the Environment: an
Overview”, Ciência e Sociedade Séries, Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia,
Brasil, (1992) (CBPF -CS-003/92).
(29)
Feu Alvim Carlos (coordenador), José Israel Vargas, Othon Luiz Pinheiro da
Silva, Omar Campos Ferreira e Frida Eidelman; Um Porto de Destino para o
Sistema Elétrico Brasileiro _ Características dos Sistemas Elétricos
Integrados do Brasil e sua Projeção até o Horizonte de 2005_ Economia e
Energia, 49, (2005).
Note 1
(p. 12) – It is surprising that the functions of lithium
were already known, an element used in the future production of the
hydrogen bomb; of lead 208 and cadmium, element used in the control bars
of power reactors. It is possible that reference to lithium is due to its
use as protons target, produced in a cyclotron as a neutron source that is
3,600 times more intense than the radium-beryllium source which was then
the only one to determine k, the multiplication coefficient of the
uranium-graphite, studied by Fermi and Szilard.
Note 2 (p. 14) - The Commission was composed of: Bernardino de Mattos, as chairman, and
Arthur Moses, Bernardo Geisel, Carlos Chagas Filho,
Elisiário Távora, Ernani de Motta Rezende, Francisco Maffei, Joaquim Costa
Ribeiro, José Leite Lopes, Luiz Cintra Prado, Marcello Damy de Souza
Santos and Luiz Pilla.
Note 3 (p. 21) -
CNEN, since its establishment 47 years ago and up to
now, was subordinated to different administrative institutions. Until
1967, Presidency of the Republic; between1967 and 1986, Ministry of Mines
and Energy (Decree nº 60,900/67);
from 1986 to 1999, Presidency of the Republic (Secretariat of National
Defense Consultancy, SADEN/PR, Secretariat of Strategic Matters, SAE/PR
and Extraordinary Ministry of Strategic Projects, MEPE/PR, according to
Decrees nº 93,337/86 and nº 2,823/99 and Law nº 8,028/90); and finally, from 1999 on, the Ministry
of Science and Technology ( MP n 1,911/99). It is obvious that this varied
subordination reflects the big fluctuations of our nuclear policy.
Note 4 (p. 24) - Cooperation with France was intensified with the
visit of the present author to that country in 1961, invited by Jean
Debièsse then director of the Saclay Laboratory, connected with the French
Atomic Energy Commission who visited Brazil in that year. After missions
to France of dozens Brazilian scientists and technicians, French
specialists came to Brazil for cooperation in all areas involved with the
project of nuclear power plants to be fueled with metallic natural
uranium, moderated by graphite and refrigerated by carbonic gas. This
cooperation in power reactors was interrupted in 1964 and resumed, with
much less intensity in the ambit of the Thorium Project, conceived at IPR,
which lasted until the end of 1973 when opted for the acquisition of a
pressurized-water, enriched-uranium-fuelled power reactor (PWR) from the
United State (Angra I). See also note 8.
Note 5 (p. 27) – The commission responsible for formulating the
safeguards regime, in which Brazil participated, remained blocked: the
USSR was against the inspection system which it considered as a mere
spying instrument; France abstained, maintaining that it would impair the
development of its own program; the developing countries like India,
Brazil and Iran were against the referred mechanisms because they consider
it discriminatory and detrimental to their interest. I remember that as a
consequence of a series of explosions of Chinese atomic bombs both France
and USSR have adhered to most of the items of the safeguards system.
Therefore the difficulty created relative to the implantation of the
inspection system was overcome and at the same time the members of the
atomic club were exempted from it. This privilege benefits not only those
pioneer countries of the system but also the non-signatories of the Treaty
of Non Proliferation (TNP) such as India, Pakistan and Israel.
The IAEA’s Board
of Governors was composed of three groups of countries: members of the
Atomic Club that have nuclear weapons; countries that have important
reserves of atomic minerals in their own territory or in their colonies;
and the most developed countries of each continent. Brazil was part of the
last group due to its active and independent participation as well as its
scale of development since the beginning of the nuclear era. The United
States have contested the Brazilian condition of most advanced country of
the region; the United States government proposed that our participation
in the IAEA would be alternated with that of Argentina. For this purpose,
the Board of Governors designated a committee of three members, chaired by
the physicist
Gunnar Randers, to hear the delegation of each
country: the Argentine delegation was directed by Admiral Quihillalt
assisted by three specialist while the Brazilian one was directed by
professor Marcelo Damy de Souza Santos, assisted by F. B. Franco-Netto,
Luiz Cintra do Prado and the present author. The committee met with the
interested parties in Paris during one month in order to formulate
conclusive recommendations to the Board of Governors about the issue. As
it was easy to foresee, the technical commission did not achieve any
result and addressed the issue back to the Board. According to the IAEA
statute, the decision would be reached through voting. Evaluation of votes
suggested a probable victory of Brazil but this was not consolidated
because Brazil withdrew its candidacy in the last moment according to
governmental instructions. Since then, Brazil participates in the Board
alternating with Argentina. (Board of Governors, International Atomic
Energy Agency, GOV/INF/ 74, 2 Jul 1962.)
Note 6 (p.28) –The different agreements for controlling nuclear
production use and tests were the following:
1°) August
1963: Treaty that prohibits tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in
the outer space and in oceans.
2°) February
1967: Tlatelolco Treaty, that prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America
and Caribbean, which was only confirmed in 1994 after many.
3°) July
1968: Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that prohibits the official five
nuclear weapons states to transfer material and technology to other
countries. On the other hand, these countries agree never to produce
nuclear bombs.
4°) February 1971:
Prohibits tests of nuclear weapons and mass destruction weapons at the
bottom of the ocean and underground
5°) May 1972: Agreement between the United States
and the Soviet Union about limitation of anti-ballistic missiles systems.
6°) June 1973: Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union
about prevention of nuclear war.
7°) June 1979: The United States and the Soviet
Union have signed an agreement that limits the qualitative and
quantitative growth of strategic nuclear weapons.
8°) April 1995: The United Nations Security Council
guarantees assistance to nations that are signatory of the NPT which are
object of or threatened by nuclear attack.
9°) September 1996: Treaty of Nuclear Tests Prohibition to which 155
countries have adhered but India, Pakistan and North Korea have refused to
sign it.
10°) May 2000: The five nuclear weapon states signed an agreement to make
efforts to eliminate totally their nuclear arsenals.
11°) December 2003: Iran signs the Protocol
additional to the NPT; at the same time Libya announces that it has
renounced de development of mass destruction weapons.
12°) December 2004: North Korea announces that it
possesses nuclear bomb.
Note 7 (p.35) – As a
consequence of this visit and my favorable position regarding the
autonomous development of the fuel cycle in Brazil using thorium,
according to reliable source, the National Security Council has proposed
and obtained a secret decree that has prohibited the Brazilian Nuclear
Commission to maintain relationships with the present author.
Note 8 (p. 38) – Staff of
the Thorium Group in December 1966: Wiltold Piotr Stefan Lepecki, Carlos
Márcio Mascarenhas Dale, Sérgio de Salvo Brito, Jair Carlos Mello, Carlos
Alberto Ferreira Lima, Fernando Antônio Nogueira Carneiro, José Mendonça
de Lima, Ricardo Brant Pinheiro, Carlos Werth Urban, Walkírio Ronaldo
Andrada Lavorato, Paulo de Carvalho Tófani, Paulo Márcio Furtado, João
Luiz Campos, Juarez Távora Veado, Paulo M. Guedes, Serafim M. Lages, Guido
Afonso Lages and Borisas Cimbleris. In 1967the staff included: Jair Carlos
Mello, Ricardo Brant Pinheiro, Carlos Alberto Ferreira Lima, Fernando
Antônio Nogueira Carneiro and José Mendonça de Lima, Carlos Márcio
Mascarenhas Dale, Carlos Werth Urban and Walkírio Ronaldo Andrada
Lavorato, Paulo Márcio Furtado and Paulo de Carvalho Tófani, João Luiz
Campos, Juarez Távora Veado, Paulo M. Guedes, Serafim M. Lages, Guido
Afonso Lages and Borisas Cimbleris.
The following post-graduation students also participated: M.S.B. Faria,
L.F.B.M. Campos, M. E. L. Torres, G.P. Guimarães, Eustáquio Van Petten
Machado and José Eduardo Morais Filho.
Note 9 (p. 40) –No matter how inconsistent was the policy adopted by CDTN, which caused
the migration of many technicians and scientists to the University, this
fact permitted the creation of 6 high level post-graduation courses in
Metallurgy, Physics, Computation Science, Nuclear Techniques and Sciences,
Thermal Engineering and Chemistry. A high number of specialists in these
areas had an important role in the development of basic industrial
technology area (industrial quality, under the leadership of professor
Juarez Távora Veado from the Metallurgy Department of the Minas Gerais
University and from IPR), as well as in the definition of public policies
for the Environmental area (creation of COPAM, Environment Policy
Commission of the Minas Gerais State). It was also important the
participation of engineers from the nuclear sector in the development of
the National Alcohol Program; ironically, they have contributed, as
members of the João Pinheiro Foundation, to the formulation of a personnel
training program (the Pró-Nuclear), at the request of President Ernesto
Geisel himself, during a lunch in the National Congress Club, during the
activities of the Federal Congress Commission regarding the Brazilian
Nuclear Program. This Commission was chaired by the then Senator Franco
Montoro. Pró-Nuclear, managed by CNPq, was very successful and was an
effective help to satisfy the personnel demand stimulated by the future
agreement with Germany.
Note 10 (p. 47) IPEN has probably escaped from this arbitrary
measure not only because it was an autarchy of Minas Gerais but because it
was involved in other projects excluded from the safeguards rules
established by the IAEA, applied to NUCLEBRAS and soon after to CDTN and
IEN, which became part of this enterprise. This permitted IPEN, which was
linked to CNEN, to establish cooperation with the Brazilian Navy from 1978
on for the development of ultracentrifugation. According to the agreement
with Germany, CDTN would absorb the enrichment technology foreseen in the
agreement which, as it is known, was very limited (see reference 16 where
it is also describe the initiative of the Air Force Technical Center to
obtain the isotopic uranium enrichment using lasers).
Note 11
(p. 52) – The Brazilian Nuclear Program Evaluation Commission was chaired by the
present author and Professor Oscar Salla was vice-chairman. The Commission
was composed of: Alberto Pereira de Castro (IPT), Caspar Erich Stemer
(UFSC), Eduardo Penna Franca (UFRJ), Fernando Cláudio Zawislak (UFRGS),
José Ephim Mindlin (Metal Leve), José Pelúcio Ferreira (FINEP), Luiz
Renato Caldas (UFRJ), Paulo Francini (FIESP), Marcelo Damy de Souza Santos
(IEA and USP), Ramayana Gazzinelli (UFMG), José Leite Lopes (CBPF and
representing the MST), José Guilherme Araújo Lameira Bittencourt (IBQN),
Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves (Secretariat of CSN), Roberto Rodrigues
Krause (MRE), José Wanderley Coelho Dias (Nuclebrás). Representatives of
the Planning Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic, of the
Financial Ministry and of the Ministry of Urban Development and
Environment were invited as observers.
The Commission
has alerted, in its recommendation number 4, that: “Considering the
advanced development of the national program of pacific applications of
nuclear energy in Brazil and Argentina, that are actually equivalent, the
bilateral nuclear cooperation should be intensified, aiming at, among
others, the promotion of joint undertakings in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, as well as the establishment of a gradual mechanism of
mutual inspection of these activities in the two countries.”
Note 12 (p. 67) – Three tables show investments consolidation in
the nuclear fuel cycle and in nuclear plants, excluding financial costs.
Source: CAPNB (1986)
____________ The data analysis is made in the The American cold essay in this issue.
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