Economy & Energy
Year XIV-No 82
June - September
2011
ISSN 1518-2932

 

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Homenagem ao Prof. Francisco Magalhães Gomes

To the memory of Francisco de Assis Magalhães Gomes and to the 60th anniversary of CDTN, former IPR.

Nuclear Energy Development: Minas and BRAZIL
(before I forget)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Nº 82: June/September de 2011  

IISSN 1518-2932

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Texts for Discussion: 

To the memory of Francisco de Assis Magalhães Gomes and to the 60th anniversary of CDTN, former IPR.

José Israel Vargas

In an essay published in March 2013, organized by my friend Márcio Quintão Moreno to commemorate the centenary of birth of the remembered mentor, Francisco Magalhães Gomes, whom I denominated “a scientist who believed”, I said in my contribution that he was one of those improbable person that to our astonishment we meet from times to times since it is so rare the combination of sensitivity and vast humanistic culture, technical formation of an engineer, of which our friend was so proud.

Living in an era of great euphoria in the scientific field, specially in Physics, Magalhães Gomes did not accept the timidity and underdevelopment of education and research institutions in which his own generation was formed and which he was committed to modernize.

He was an undisputed pioneer in the start of nuclear and science studies areas in Brazil and he was aware that it was not only the case of guaranteeing the production of cheap energy because he rightly foresaw that nuclear technology would be the driver of modernity since it demanded a high degree of excellence in all the mobilized correlated domains.

One can add to the legacy of moral category that we have received from him: the honest intellectual, the generous, modest man who was glad with the success of anyone, committed to the truth of science whose cultivation he induced in the younger ones.

A first version of this article was presented at Commemorative Symposium of the Birth Centenary of Francisco Assis Magalhães Gomes organized by the Center of Nuclear Technology Development – CDTN of the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission – CNEN in August 2007 as part of the “3rd World Triga Users Conference”.

1.Introduction

In 1900, last year of the 19th century, Lord Kelvin, in a speech at the British Association for the Progress of Science, said that all big problems of physics were virtually solved and, according to him, there were two exceptions:

- The explanation of the black body emission spectrum;

- Explanation of the de Michelson and Morley experiment results about the velocity of light relative to the movement of the Earth (of ether).

As we know, the solution of these two problems mentioned by Kelvin, besides the explanation of radioactivity (ref 1) and of the photoelectric effect (ref 2), led to the big science revolution of the 20th century with the development of Quantum Mechanics, the Relativity Theory and the development of Nuclear Physics. At that time many other very important discoveries came to light, among them the fission of the atomic nucleus by the chemists O. Hahn and F. Strassmann.

Later, this discovery led to a revolution regarding the redistribution of the political and economic power in the world and has created serious problems that, we fear, will continue forever to accompany the human species, as clearly corroborated by the events that presently pervade the international conjuncture day in day out (ref 3).

Magalhães Gomes was aware that the implementation of any independent nuclear program presupposes the development of the fuel cycle which implies:

1°) succeed in mineral and geological research regarding uranium and thorium, as well as other materials of interest, up to the production of the fuel elements themselves containing or not uranium enriched in the isotope of mass 235, or plutonium 239 which, as it is known, is artificially produced from uranium 238;

2°) complete mastering of design, engineering, process and production of relevant materials;

3°) definition of dimensions and economical aspects of the plants to be eventually constructed comparatively to other existing options to satisfy future demand; and finally

4°) in the long term, it is necessary the definition of means to be adopted regarding the storage after reprocessing of fuels already used during the lifetime of power plants and that are highly radioactive (which emit radiations for hundreds of years).

The Brazilian Nuclear policy since 1946 has tried more or less successfully to follow almost all these steps. As it will be see, it was preceded, already before the last world war, by the development, even though incipient (in the applied area), of human resources in basic nuclear physics and search of radioactive materials, among them naturally uranium (source of one of the three natural radioactive series), that became indispensable for the future development of the sector. This tradition, albeit limited, gave birth to leaders who would nourish the hope of national success regarding the new energy technology.

Actually, the early discovery in Brazil of radioactivity in hydro mineral waters (notably in Poços de Caldas and later in Araxá, both in Minas Gerais), indicating the occurrence of important nuclear materials (ref 4), was contemporary to the advances in France, Germany, England and Italy of this sector. From the latter came to Brazil Gleb Wataghin and Giuseppe Occhialini, professors of young Brazilians, who were pioneers of the Brazilian Nuclear Physics in São Paulo (ref 4).

A special mention should be made of Bernard Gross who started in Rio de Janeiro in 1934 studies of cosmic radiations in the Division of Electricity and Electric Measures of INT. The scientists Marcelo Damy de Souza Santos and Joaquim Costa Ribeiro would participate in the first commission, created in January 20, 1947, for the official control and inspection of strategic materials (CFME) in the ambit of the National Security Council. Several of these materials, as we have mentioned, occurred in our country, mainly verified by the geology and geochemical group created in Minas Gerais by the great geologist Djalma Guimarães. In fact, he has described in 1929 the occurrence of uranium associated with niobium- tantalum compounds (ref 5), in S. João Del Rei.

Incidentally, these studies reflected the influence of the great Viktor Goldschmidt, leader of an important group created at the University of Göttingen, who was the true father of modern geochemistry describing in a daring and innovative way the distribution of chemical elements on the earth crust. It is now known that Djalma Guimarães had close relationship with the German researchers through a continuous correspondence with C. W. Correns, member of the prominent Göttingen school. Confirmation of these contacts, as well as several studies carried out by the Minas Gerais group about nuclear materials along the subsequent decade, are described in the notable historical survey published by Cláudio V. Dutra, one of the most distinguished participant of the mentioned group (ref 6). It should be remembered that the studies of these pioneers led to the discovery of important phosphates reserves in Patos, Araxá and Patrocínio, in Minas Gerais, as well as the niobium of Araxá, of high economic and strategic value for Brazil. Recently, the MCTI has celebrated the development of zircalloy for fabrication of fuel elements. Niobium alloys could also be used for that purpose.

Before de 1940s and also later, similarly to what happened with the Minas Gerais group, many others have contributed in this research area, both in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. In this period it should be mentioned the names of Francisco Maffei and Luiz Cintra do Prado (São Paulo), Irnack Carvalho do Amaral, Elisiário Távora, Alexandre Girotto, Sílvio Fróes de Abreu and the already mentioned Bernardo Gross.

The drive of these studies was notably accelerated due to the influence of Almirante Álvaro Alberto da Motta e Silva and César Lattes, the co-discoverer of the méson µ (ref 7). The former represented Brazil in the then recently created United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. This Commission tried to regulate the production and the political consequences of the use of this new form of energy and the promotion of internationalization and control of all nuclear materials (Baruch Plan), rejected by Brazil. He has also decisively contributed to the formulation of the clause called “specific compensations” for regulating supply in exchange of materials of nuclear interest to the industrialized countries that had important U reserves.

It is probable that Admiral Álvaro Alberto’s position, as well as that of his Brazilian colleges, was influenced in the short term by the publication in August 12, 1945 of the Smyth Report, which surprisingly made public, after six days of the atomic bomb explosion in Hiroshima, important information about the American program of military use of nuclear energy (ref 8). In the introduction of this report, it is recalled that the application of the E = mc2 equation demonstrates that the transformation of 1 kg of mass in energy would be three billion higher than that obtained from the burning of 1kg of mineral coal, the fuel more commonly used from the industrial revolution on, started in the 19th century.

Possibly, it is the inestimable information contained in this report that led the National Security Council to create at the beginning of 1947 the already mentioned CEFME (Commission for the Study and Inspection of Strategic Materials). It managed to promptly define uranium, thorium, besides beryl, boron, cadmium, graphite and even radiogenic lead as materials of interest for nuclear energy (Note 1). The Commission decided that the ore of most of these materials, together with niobium and zircon, would have their exploration, commerce and inspection strictly controlled. Later, it was also decided that in case uranium and/or thorium were minor components of any mineral, as in the case of niobium from Araxá (which contains 2% of thorium), discovered by Djalma Guimarães, the eventual explorer was obliged to return to the government, without any charge for the latter, the equivalent of these elements in the form of pure chemical compounds (ref 9). This decision was adopted by suggestion of the Commission chaired by Prof. Francisco Magalhães Gomes, and by Prof. Joaquim Maia (University of Ouro Preto), Prof. José Israel Vargas and by the Engineer Luiz de Oliveira Castro.

Concurrently, the international important repercussion about the discovery of the meson with the participation of César Lattes has much contributed to our nuclear policy. It was thought that the meson could catalyze nuclear fusion through the reaction of proton with deuterium generating 5.5 Mev of energy per event. In case this reaction would be possible, it would be able to generate cleaner nuclear energy than that from uranium fission. Unfortunately these expectations did not come true (ref 10).

2. The role of CNPq

The verification of the notorious insufficiency of Brazil regarding human resources as well as research infrastructure motivated Admiral Álvaro Alberto and César Lattes, supported by other scientists, to propose the creation of the National Research Council (CNPq), made effective by the Law 1.310 of January 15, 1951 of which Álvaro Alberto was the first president. He also proposed in 1950 the measure made effective by the Decree 150 that reinforced the limitations already established for the commerce of strategic materials, notably uranium and thorium. As a consequence, commerce of these elements would be possible only in operations from government to government. According to Ninon Machado, this was an anticipation of the monopoly of all nuclear activities, as will be seen below, that would be valid until now. (ref 11).

CNPq, besides the responsibility of stimulating research and development activities, preparation of human resources in Brazil and abroad, would also be responsible for the rigid control and inspection of the materials mentioned above, using the Decree 438, of 1938, whose penalties would be applied to those who did not observe the Law 1310.

Subsequently it was established the Atomic Energy Commission in the ambit of the National Research Council itself, composed of twelve members representing both the government and the scientific community (Note 2).Soon after, cooperation links were established with the United States and France, notably through the French company “Société des Produits Chimiques des Terres Rares”. This permitted careful studies of uranium extraction contained in caldasite contained in uranium from Poços de Caldas. For this purpose a group of chemists headed by Alexandre Girotto, who managed to produce the first 900g of metallic uranium from a Brazilian ore, was sent to France by CNPq. The process used was the first international patent in the name of CNPq (ref 12).

Agreement with Americans made possible research regarding nuclear minerals in different areas of the country, mainly Minas Gerais, by the geologists Max White and Gene Tolbert. This cooperation had frequently the presence of other specialist from the U.S. Geological Survey (ref 10).

Research on atomic minerals went on in collaboration with France under the aegis of the Nuclear Energy Commission, oriented by Elisiário Távora, and by the future Nuclebras. Reserves resulting from these studies and those from Nuclebras, under the direction of John Milne de Albuquerque Forman, permitted Brazil to have the sixth largest world uranium reserve (ref 13).

The known uranium occurrences in Brazil are in the oriental part of the country and are the following (personal communication with Prof. Umberto Cordani): the two main ones Lagoa Real (Caetité, Ba) and Itatatia (Santa Quitéria, Ce) are located in areas of outcropping old rocks (ages above 1800 My) but which were heated and tectonically reactivated around 500-600 My. The uranium minerals must have been formed in this last era. The same is true for the Espinharas (PB) occurrence and maybe, for Amorinópolis (Go).

The Moeda occurrence, in the Iron Quadrangle, near Belo Horizonte, is situated in the meta-conglomerate of the Minas Group, aged about 2400 My. It is possible that the uranium mineral has a similar age.

The Poços de Caldas occurrence is situated in the volcanic massif with about 80 My and the uranium minerals must be slightly younger.

The Figueira (Pr) occurrence is situated in the Paraná Basin, in sandstone with about 300 My. The uranium minerals are younger and might be associated with basaltic lava flow with about 130 My. (ref 14).

Concurrently with the initial actions in the materials area, CNPq – directly subordinated to the Presidency – had the support of the Physics Department of São Paulo University (founded in 1934) and of the Brazilian Physics Research Center (CBPF), created in 1949 by César Lattes, José Leite Lopes and Jaime Tiomno, to start the implantation of the varied research infrastructure in the country. Besides studies on cosmic radiation and theoretical nuclear physics, CBPF was pioneer in studies regarding condensed matter and nuclear chemistry, particularly applications of the Mossbauer Effect, which had the leadership of Jacques Danon.

From 1951 on, a betatron accelerator (Marcello Damy) and a Van Der Graff electrostatic generator (Oscar Salla) were installed in São Paulo; in Rio de Janeiro it was installed a Cockcroft-Walton accelerator and the assembling of a cyclotron of reduced energy in the Navy Arsenal, by initiative of C. Lattes, which was never concluded. Following these initiatives, the Institute of Radioactive Research (IPR) in the University of Minas Gerais was established in 1952, under the leadership of Francisco Magalhães Gomes. In 1956 it was created the Institute of Atomic Energy in São Paulo, under the direction of Marcelo Damy de Souza Santos; later the Institute of Nuclear Engineering was installed in Rio de Janeiro, directly subordinated to CNEN.

The program also benefitted young physicists from Rio Grande do Sul, Gerhard Jakob, Darcy Dillenburg and Fernando Zawislawski, who worked at IPEN under the direction of Professor Marcelo Damy and in the Physics Department of the Faculty of Philosophy, Science and Literature, under the orientation of Professor Oscar Salla. This group was considerably amplified by the presence of the distinguished German theoretical physicist Theodor Maris and other foreign scientists.

Initially, IPR carried out studies in the nuclear electronic area (Eduardo Schmidt Monteiro de Castro; Magalhães Gomes was physics professor both at the Engineering School and Faculty of Philosophy, Science and Literature of the University of Minas Gerais); studies on prospection and physical analysis of nuclear ores and materials (Cassio de Mendonça and Willer Florêncio). The technique of nuclear emulsions, developed in Bristol and successfully applied by César Lattes in his pioneer research in the area of high energy physics (cosmic rays), was used (ref 10). Milton Vieira Campos made studies of radiochemistry (after a period in Chicago); Cássio Mendonça Pinto, (former collaborator of Fritz Feigel, in DNPM), Full Professor of inorganic chemistry at the Engineering School and of Physics-chemistry at the Faculty of Philosophy, has developed various original methods for analysis of uranium and niobium mineral complexes. Several young chemists, physicists, engineers and mathematicians were sent abroad for training, including the author of the present article, who attended in Chile the first Latin America nuclear chemistry course, given by Alfred G. Maddock, his future Ph.D advisor professor at Cambridge University.

 

3. The Atoms for Peace program and the international situation of the nuclear sector 

The three Institutes soon had the benefit of the “Atoms for Peace” program, launched by President Eisenhower in 1953. Three research reactors were installed in São Paulo (IEA), in Minas Gerais (IPR) and in Rio de Janeiro (IEN), respectively in 1957, 1960 and 1961. These equipments had an important role in the development of application of nuclear techniques in the country, notably in the use of radioisotopes in industry, in nuclear chemistry, in radioprotection and in medicine. They provided training of personnel who later would compose the Nuclear Engineering studies and projects groups. It should be specially mentioned the Power Reactors Group (GRP), created in the ambit of CNEN, that had a close French cooperation from 1962 on. It was headed by Professor Jonas Santos from the National Engineering School of the University of Brazil.

The power of the Minas Gerais and São Paulo reactors, initially limited to 30 and 1,000 kW (5000 kW nominal), respectively, were upgraded to 250 and 3,000 kW. The Argonauta reactor of the Institute of Nuclear Engineering in Rio de Janeiro maintained its power in 10 kW, and late it was added a low energy cyclotron used for radioisotopes for nuclear medicine. The experience soon acquired through the operation of those reactors, in the areas mentioned above, can be traced in the various communications presented at the Utilization of Research Reactors Meeting (ref 16) in São Paulo in 1963, sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Brazilian delegation to this Meeting had 76 participants.

4. The establishment of CNEN (1956 and 1962) and the relationship of Brazil with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Relative to the institutional plan, it was created by presidential Decree Nº 4,011, and after ample public debate, during the Kubitschek administration, the National Nuclear Energy Commission, directed linked to the President of the Republic. It replaced the commission previously created in CNPq, becoming independent of it but with a different link. This link demonstrated the strategic character of the nuclear sector assumed by the government. This subordination was confirmed by the 1962 Law Nº 4,118, in spite of the fact that the sector had undergone marked modifications up to the adoption of the present structure, established by the May 28, 2003 Law Nº 10,683, which is shown in Figure 1. The varied subordination of CNEN in the last 47 years is described in Nota 3.

 

Figure 1 - Structure of the Brazilian Nuclear Sector.

The international relationships went on then always with France and the United States. With the latter, the relationship, started in 1952, renovated in 1954 practically was broken because that country had not respected the “specific compensations” corresponding to 100 tons of thorium that Brazil would supply.

This policy of specific compensation was later endorsed in 1962 with the definitive establishment of state monopoly of the nuclear activities by CNEN, established by the 1962 Law Nº 4,118. It should be noticed that the interruption of uranium and thorium exports to the United States also followed the recommendations of the Commission of Strategic Materials Exports, created by the government for this purpose, under the authority of the Foreign Affairs Minister.

These initiatives resulted in a growing awareness that the existence of nuclear weapons and the industrial production of energy using nuclear fission, which would be intensified, would have deep repercussions in the distribution and realignment of the world political and economic power.

Initially the United States and Great Britain had, for a long time, a prominent role regarding basic research, that supported the military and civil use of nuclear energy, but France had also participated in the production of the first nuclear artifact through the presence of various scientists from the Fréderic Joliot-Curie Group.

The pioneer countries soon tried to establish an international control system relative to all aspects of the new energy use. This control included, as already mentioned, the existing and to be discovered uranium ore deposits all over the world. These initiatives failed due to the predominance of national interests of other industrialized countries and the ideological polarization that became evident at the end of the Second World War and that divided the world until 1990 in two antagonistic blocks, under the leadership of the two superpowers that emerged after the conflict – the United States and the Soviet Union.

Brazil, as most of the countries, was against these initiatives, as declared at the UN Atomic Energy Commission by Admiral Álvaro Alberto because they were a violation of the national sovereignty. From then on, our country has systematically tried its own development which, however, had international cooperation. Initially, as already mentioned, the American and French partnerships were chosen (Note 4).

5. The IAEA and the evolution of the international safeguards system. The Brazilian role. The cooperation with France

The monopoly of nuclear weapons was initially broken by the Soviet Union (1949), England (1952), France (1960) and China (1960) and was amplifying the military atomic club that was composed initially only by the United States, England and the Soviet Union, all members of the United Nations Security Council. In this Council, the two main participants in the arms race – the two superpowers – supplanted their deep ideological divergences and politics aiming at maintaining the monopoly of nuclear knowledge. This policy, based on the argument that the proliferation of this knowledge would doubtless lead to the development of nuclear weapons, according to them, the accelerated multiplication of new centers of power and the increase of potential danger of starting an arms race that fatally would result in the outbreak of generalized nuclear war.

In the post-war period a series of initiatives were started aiming at handling the sensitive problem created by the growing scientific and technical mastering of the atomic nucleus, limiting it as far as possible. On one hand, it was tried to negotiate means and modes of ending the arms race. This question, which still is the core of the present international issue, had a relative success. In fact, the military expenditure of the two opposing blocks, which divided nations, continued to grow astronomically and reached values above US$ 1 trillion annually (dollars of 1955). On the other hand, it is true that various initiatives were launched to promote international agreements in order to avoid nuclear proliferation.

As a result, the Atoms for Peace program was launched in 1953 through which the United States would supply to other countries only research nuclear reactors. In spite of the small size and the strictly peaceful character of these equipments, they were submitted to strict supplier control.

In order to complement and amplify such restriction, in October 2, 1956, inspired by those counties and supported by the international community, it was established the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with headquarters in Vienna. Besides the mentioned objective, it would have the mandate to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy for the overall benefit. Its organizing committee was headed by the then Brazilian Ambassador Luiz Carlos Bernardes.

The Agency, in spite of the fact that it became a useful and important negotiating forum for alleviating East/West tensions, soon became an international instrument of a safeguards system that in fact made it difficult the generalization of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This attitude was contrary to the spirit that motivated its creation. To further aggravate this framework and with the agreement of the industrialized countries, the basic Agency’s regulation was revised in order to prevent the financing of capital goods which are indispensable, as we know, to implement nuclear programs exclusively dedicated to electric energy production in countries that have neither the capital nor the sophisticated industrial base required for this production. The safeguards system, in whose amplified formulation the present author participated in 1962-1963 as representative of Brazil, has established an international control over nuclear products, processes and information to be interchanged in the multilateral and bilateral levels; it has also generated the “contamination” concept of any component, even the most conventional ones, that were part of installations submitted to the safeguard regime. For this purpose, the IAEA created an international complex inspection system to guarantee the applications of its requirements.

The industrialized countries, led by the members of the atomic club, not satisfied with Vienna´s Agency actions, have proposed in 1968 the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that would require from its signatories the proscription in their countries of all activities that might in any way give rise to military applications (Note 5). This engagement includes the reinforcement of international inspections of all installations of IAEA countries members, except those countries that have nuclear weapons.

This mechanism has been gradually amplified through the so-called Additional Protocols to the safeguards agreements, and therefore the NPT itself, by the IAEA General Conference, the highest body of this organization, subordinated to the UN Security Council.

The proponents of the Treaty offered to the eventual signatories of this diplomatic agreement the advantageous amplification of access to atomic peaceful applications and, as a counterpart, promotion of their own disarmament. These “advantages” were illusory since they were never completely effective except belatedly and timidly through celebrated partial disarmament agreements signed by the two superpowers and that were partially abrogated by the Bush administration and maintained in the present administration of the remaining superpower (Note 6).

Besides those instruments, it was established in the ambit of Latin America and Caribbean in 1967 the Tlatelolco Treaty, precursor of NPT, to promote the proscription of atomic weapons in this area. This Treaty was involved in ups and downs not only in the countries of the region and the five components of the UN Security Council as well as countries that have territories under their tutelage in the area. During a long period France and Cuba did not sign it; Argentina did not ratify it. The big powers signed it with unacceptable reserves: the United States and England reserved the right to transport arms in the region and the Soviet Union and China did not agree. Furthermore, the United States and the Soviet Union conditioned the compliance with this diplomatic instrument (that allowed carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes) to the possibility of the development of methods to distinguish between these explosions and those with military objectives. As it is known, this option of nuclear explosions, called pacific ones, did not prosper with the ban in October 1963, through an international agreement, of nuclear artifacts tests, pacific or military.

The Tlatelolco Treaty in practice became inoperative until finally amendments proposed by Argentina, Brazil and Chile to be included in it principles, contained in the general inspection regime of the IAEA, which permitted its definitive ratification, inclusive by Brazil, through the Decree 1.246, of September 16, 1994.

It should be noticed that the countries that have technology have promulgated national legislations that are more restrictive than the existing ones regarding technology transfer. These restrictions, as we know, are difficult to be implemented and they were gradually extended to space, chemical and biological technologies (the so-called dual technologies).

Nevertheless, the uncontrolled arms race went on until the end of the 1990s, characteristic of the Cold War, when it was installed the denominated East-West terror balance that lasted until the relative détente that followed, particularly at the end of the Vietnam War (1972). It was later intensified by the dismantling of the Soviet Union which permitted the achievement of various agreements between it and the USA for stopping, as we have mentioned, experiments with nuclear bombs both in the atmosphere and underground. Moreover this permitted the progressive dismantling, even though partial, of intercontinental ballistic missiles by the Salt I and Salt II Treaties, signed in February 1971 and September 1996. In this date the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed by 155 countries but not by India, Pakistan and North Korea. On the other hand, Israel did not adhere to the NPT of July 1968, as well as India and Pakistan.

With the end of the Cold War it was expected that the bipolar power system would eliminate the huge expenses of the arms race, transferring them to promote general development. This hope, disappointing the best expectations of the poorer countries, was frustrated. Instead of it, it was installed a multi-polar power system presently including nine nuclear countries: United States, England, Russia, China, Pakistan, India, Israel, France and North Korea, all of them characterized by the most different and conflicting political and religious visions. 

The international conjuncture is dangerously aggravated particularly in the Middle East where the intention assigned to Iran (with violation of the NPT, of which it is signatory), namely that it is trying to develop nuclear weapons, could generate a conflict that would overstep the region and reach catastrophic proportions. It is reminiscent of the crisis generated in October 1963 by the installation in Cuba of the medium range missiles with nuclear warheads that dangerously made the world come close to thermonuclear war with unpredictable consequences.

In this context it is exemplary and up-to-date the agreement between Brazil and Argentina regarding the promotion of mutual inspection of their nuclear activities. It was suggested by the report “Evaluation of the Brazilian Nuclear Program” of 1986, and that motivated the creation of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) (ref 17); see also on the subject Notes 5 and 6. This bi-national Agency was established in December 12, 1991 when its first secretary took office, the Argentinean Jorge Coll who signed in the following day in Vienna the Quadripartite Agreement including Brazil, Argentina, IAEA and ABACC. This Agreement established a safeguards regime in the two countries which was analogous to that in force in the countries that have adhered to the NPT. In the following five years there was a series of discussions and meetings to evaluate the nuclear capacity of the two countries while ABACC already applied safeguards in all installations of the two countries, including the military ones. The Brazilian ratification of the Quadripartite Agreement was endorsed by the legislative Decree 11 of February 9, 1994 and it was regulated by the Presidential Decree 1.065 on February 24 of the same year.

In spite of its reticence regarding the discriminatory character of the NPT due to the reasons already presented, Brazil finally supported the Treaty and ratified it in 1997 even though it had already included in its Federal Constitution of 1988 an item that excluded the use of nuclear energy for military purposes.

The importance attained by nuclear energy can be presently evaluated by the operation of 442 nuclear power plants in 300 countries, with installed capacity of 369 GWe, as shown in Graphic XI – representing about 15% of electric energy generated in the world.

Therefore, it is justified the development of an independent nuclear program in order to create technology with a future, following the directives for the sector by the National Security Council. According to these directives, the Federal Administration, as already mentioned, will choose under the present circumstances natural uranium as the most adequate fuel for our future power plants.

This option was based on pioneering experiences in England (installation of the Calder Hall reactor, with 100MW) and in France (plants of Chinon, with the same power, in the Loire Valley). The choice was the best one for our country not only at the technical level but also at the political one. In fact, France, that was aware of its independence and that was eager to return to the prestige and leadership it had in nuclear research in the pre-war period (it had even applied for the patent of the technical conception of nuclear reactors which would be developed by Fermi in 1941) had ignored, like Brazil, the barriers to technology transfer, even for civil use, created by the IAEA. That country was willing to cooperate closely with our country to develop nuclear power plants of the mentioned type. The Working Group on Power Reactors (GTRP), already mentioned, intended to develop a complete 100 MW reactor project with the participation of high level French technicians.

The cooperation comprehensively included all sectors of the program. Besides the technical areas, an intense scientific interchange among Brazilian and French institutions took place (involving the Nuclear Study Center of Grenoble and the National Laboratory of Saclay, in Paris). This cooperation, developed mainly between 1961 and 1979, had the participation of eminent French scientific personalities. As already mentioned, the director of Saclay, Jean Debiesse, the Grenoble CEN director, Pierre Balligand, later member of the French Atomic Energy Commission, Michel Soutif, Chancellor of the University of Grenoble followed by a one-year sojourn in UFMG of professor André Moussa, head of the Nuclear Chemistry Laboratory, of Daniel Dautreppe, head of Division of Fundamental Studies, and of Pierre Servoz-Gavin, head of the Magnetic Resonance Laboratory. During one year we had the collaboration of CNRS’s physicist André Baudry as well as that of the young researchers Paul Vuillet, Pierre Boyer, Alan Chappe, Christian Jeandey, besides Madame Pierrette Auric.

The political and economic instability that materialized in Brazil and the change in the framework of our international relationships, caused by the 1964 coup d’état, have interrupted this process of French technology appropriation. It should be remembered that both France and England have abandoned at that time the natural uranium-gas-graphite reactor type because those countries have decided to build nuclear submarines whose propulsion needed the American technology of reactors fuelled with enriched uranium and moderated and cooled by pressurized water.

 

6. The Thorium Group

From 1965 to 1973, due to the non-definition by the federal authorities regarding the reactor type to be adopted for the Nuclear Program and due to the natural uranium line left behind by England and France, our major partner, it was created at IPR the so called Thorium Group. The original conception of this group was to use thorium, which is abundant in our country, associated with uranium, for producing independently electric energy. A reference project was developed for a 30MW reactor fuelled with natural uranium and thorium and heavy water. This project would permit the elaboration of three other options: the Instinto Project, developed in 1966/1967 (enriched uranium – thorium – heavy water); the Toruna Project, from 1968 to 1971(natural uranium and heavy water) and finally, from 1971 to 1973 there was also the Pluto Project (plutonium – thorium – heavy water). These concepts and projects are described in three International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publications. The first one, Thorium-cycle possibilities in the Brazilian nuclear program (ref 18), the second one, “The INSTINTO Project – A status and progress report on the thorium reactor development program” (ref 19) and, finally, the third one, “Preliminary assessment of heavy-water thorium reactors in the Brazilian Nuclear Program” (ref 20).

These studies had the support of the Atomic Energy agencies of France, Germany, Sweden and the participation of members from the Institute of Nuclear Engineering (IEN) in Rio de Janeiro, through the engineers Luiz Osório de Brito Aghina and J.A. Nóbrega, in reactor physics, and J. Ribeiro da Costa, in structural engineering. In Saclay, França, there was the participation of the engineer Ricardo B. Pinheiro, from IPR’s Thorium Group, in the staff headed by Roger Naudet and composed of Marcel Chabrillac, Annick Boivineau and S. Goldstein.

It should be pointed out the interest of France regarding the resume of nuclear cooperation with Brazil demonstrated by the visit to our country of a French delegation headed by André Giraud, important member of the Atomic Energy Commission of that country. I participated in that mission invited by the Brazilian government as group leader of research at the Grenoble Center of Nuclear Studies where I worked from 1965 to 1972. The delegation aimed at negotiating not only future work with the Thorium Group but also the use of electric energy, available through the Itaipu project, for uranium enrichment using gaseous diffusion technology to be supplied by France (Note 7). A memento of this visit is shown in the photograph below (Figure 2).

 

Figure 2 – Visit of André Giraud to the Thorium Project.

I also remember with pleasure and gratitude the role played by the Director of the Grenoble Center of Nuclear Studies, Mister Pierre Balligand, shown in Figure 3.

 

Figure 3 - Pierre Balligand, Director of the Grenoble Center of Nuclear Studies

His relationship with Brazil has started through the IAEA of which he was Deputy General Director and that were extended beyond Grenoble where he was Commissioner for Technical-Scientific Diversification of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The Minas Gerais group had also the assistance of professors Borisas Cimbleris (thermal engineering) and J. Z. F. Diniz (structural engineering). In the ambit of the project were installed a Subcritical Unit (Capitu) and others for studying the thermal behavior of the fuel elements and of components to be eventually developed. Calculation programs were also developed for calculations necessary for the above mentioned technical options.

It should be mentioned that since thorium is not a fissile element (except using high energy neutrons), that is, it is transmutable into uranium 233 by capture of thermal neutrons (followed by beta decay), it was evident that the success of the thorium project would need, for the execution of the three chosen alternatives, the previous existence of a power reactor fuelled by natural uranium or enriched uranium with appropriate power estimated in 30MW. In the case of plutonium, a transuranium element, it would be necessary to separate it from irradiated uranium or use it directly, in situ, after bombarding uranium238 with neutrons.

The difficulties of obtaining the considerable investments regarding financial and equipment resources as well as technical capacity needed to implement the above mentioned phases and the lack of the indispensable support from the Federal Government brought the project to an end. It involved the active participation of 20 young engineers from IPR, listed in Note 8.

This approach did not interest the main nuclear energy generation countries, except India which has no uranium reserves and has sustained in the last half century research on the thorium cycle. As it is well known, the success of this line implies the availability of enriched uranium that was until recently not accessible to this country. The recent signature of an India-United States agreement permits India to circumvent this obstacle that it has faced since 1951 and the country has decided to build a regenerating reactor using the thorium cycle and moderated by heavy water and it will construct a large number of reactors called fast reactors to produce electricity and generate uranium 233 as well (ref 21).

China, on the other hand, has chosen, among the most important projects relative to Scientific and Technological Development, to launch a program of a molten salt thorium cycle reactor. According to studies carried out by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ref 21), this type of reactor will produce energy at low cost with safety, efficiency and sustainability. According to the above referred site, the Chinese research and development project is cheaper than the technology adopted in India (ref 22). Recent comparisons of thorium and uranium cycles have recently been made by the English Department of Energy and Climate Change (ref 23). These facts should induce the Brazilian government to resume the studies started in the 1960s by the Institute of Radioactive Research (IRD) aiming at, at least, to follow the most important mentioned initiatives and naturally taking into account that our country has the 6th world reserve according to a survey carried out by the "World Nuclear Association”, as shown in Table 9 (Assured World Reserves of thorium).

It should be observed that several engineers and researchers, who had left IPR when they were transferred to CNEN, have significantly contributed to promote or consolidate six post-graduation courses at the Minas Gerais Federal University (UFMG). Furthermore, some who have left IPR were assigned relevant functions in different important programs of the federal and state administration (Note 9), such as the Industrial Quality Program and the alcohol engine.

Until 2006 these courses have graduated 1,043 MSc and 399 PhD, considering only the Chemistry, Physics and Nuclear Science and Techniques sectors. Analogous experiences must have occurred in other institutions illustrating the important catalytic role of state-of-the-art technologies regarding the preparation of high level human resources.

The evolution of the technical-scientific production of the Institute is shown in Graphics I, II and III in IPR; IV in CDTN; V and VI in IPEN; VII, VIII and IX in the Institutes of CNEN. In Graphic III are presented pulses in the cumulative growth of the published studies obtained by the derivate of its growth curve.

Graphic I - Cumulative number of studies published by IPR (1953 - 1972).

Graphic II - Logistic treatment of the technical-scientific evolution of IPR production between 1953 and 1972

Graphic III – Pulse analysis of the logistic treatment of the technical-scientific evolution by IPR between 1953 and 1972.

Graphic IV – Cumulative number of studies published by CDTN (1973-2005).

Graphic V – Cumulative number of studies published by IPEN (1958 - 2005).

Graphic VI – Logistic treatment of technical-scientific production evolution of IPEN between 1958 and 2005

Graphic VII – Cumulative number of studies published by IEN/CNEN, 1958 – 2005

Graphic VIII - Logistic treatment of technical-scientific production evolution of IEN/CNEN 1958 – 2005

Graphic IX - Logistic treatment of technical-scientific production evolution of IEN/CNEN 1958 - 1979

They clearly indicate maximum productivity in 1960, 1964 and 1970 followed by notable decrease corresponding respectively to concentration of efforts on assembling and inauguration of the Triga reactor in 1960, and to the negative effect of the military coup in 1964, corroborated by the dramatic decrease of scientific production after that event. It is also noted the effect of transferring IPR to CBTN (CNEN) as well as of the dissolution of the Thorium Group afterwards. All these graphics were obtained by applying the modeling developed by Marchetti and frequently used in studies of the present author (ref 24).

It is worthwhile to remember that the experience gained by the Thorium Group would be used later in the project of the experimental fuel element construction using thorium and uranium in cooperation with German technicians in the ambit of the agreement with the former Federal Republic of Germany.

It should be mentioned that in 1966 the President General, H. Castelo Branco, through the Decree Law 200 has subordinated CNEN to the Ministry of Mines and Energy, removing it from the Presidency and consequently reducing its political status. I remember that I have immediately protested against this measure in a telegram sent to the president of the Republic.

As a consequence of this new subordination, it was created at the Ministry of Mines and Energy a working group composed of CNEN, Eletrobras and Furnas representatives that recommended the construction of a 500MWe reactor. This recommendation was adopted by the New National Nuclear Energy Policy of the Costa e Silva administration. In spite of the treatment received by the Thorium Group from the government, it was decided to engage all existing technical personnel at all levels, including those who were abroad. For this purpose, Ambassador Sérgio Corrêa da Costa was responsible for maintaining contact with the then “exiled” scientists.

7. Agreement with the United States and construction of Angra I. Establishment of CBTN and Nuclebrás. Agreement with Germany.

The first contacts with Germany were started at the time of the visit of Chancellor Willy Brandt to Brazil when it was agreed that the two countries would execute a scientific-technological cooperation.

These understandings as well as the projected measures were frustrated at the end of the Costa e Silva administration. Instead of the participation of the scientific community, including those who were abroad, new and violent repression measures were applied and the sector was deeply modified from 1970 to 1974. The Brazilian Company of Nuclear Technology (CBTN) was established, a new enterprise that should implement the program of the new policy. All institutes, except IPEN, an autarchy of USP, were absorbed by CBTN by a decree and IPR gained a new denomination (Note 10).

The Cooperation Agreement with the United States was revised in July 17, 1972 and a new diplomatic instrument was then specifically referred as “Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy”.

CBTN naturally changed the research programs of the institutes, the Thorium Group, as we have mentioned, was extinguished and contradictorily it was decided to increase studies about the possibility of participation of the Brazilian industry in the construction of a 500 MWE power plant, suggested by the previous administration. Specifications regarding this purpose were distributed for the construction of this plant in Angra dos Reis. At the same time an international bidding process was opened and Empresa Brasileira de Engenharia became responsible for equipment assembly; Gibbs & Hill (USA) and Promon Engenharia (Brazil) were responsible for elaborating the project. Civil works would be carried out by Norberto Odebrecht.

This power plant of 625 MW would be fuelled by natural uranium since – it was then considered – would be impossible to reach in the near future autonomy in Brazil regarding the fuel cycle; Brazil would depend on foreign fuel supply and therefore, it was vulnerable.

It became clear that the adopted policy was contrary to all disposition of implanting an independent fuel cycle, established in 1946.

The governmental decision which had announced that the construction of the Angra Power Plant was a fundamental instrument for technology transfer was also frustrated. The national participation was limited to only 6% of the plant final cost, even though its installation had permitted considerable experience assimilation by our technicians, mainly concerning operation security. Regretfully, this decision isolated and discouraged the considerable human potential in our research institutes and universities.

The recognized limitations during the Angra I construction, due first to dubious nature of the project itself, the technique shown in similar power plants then installed in other countries; the inexperience regarding the sector management, as well as other factors pointed out in reference (16), caused a long delay in the plant construction which started operation only in 1983.

The end of the Médici administration coincided with the first oil crisis – the cost of a barrel jumped from US$ 3.88 to US$12.55 – and large increase of electricity demand.

The acuteness of the energy crisis that then erupted (the installed power was 17.4 GW) led the new administration to adopt different measures not only to reduce our external energy dependency – mainly oil – but also to explore national alternative sources, particularly hydroelectricity and the use of biomass (start of the Alcohol Program).

From 1975 to 1983 new projects were launched: Tucuruí, Foz de Areia, Salto Osório, Salto Santiago and São Félix, besides the Candiota coal plant, totaling about 9GW to which it should be added the bi-national Itaipu with 12.6 MW of installed power. These measures have more than doubled the installed power left by the previous administration.  

In fact, de energy situation in 1975 was characterized by a continuous increase of electricity consumption which reached 10.2% and 18.2% annually, respectively, in the two subsequent years. The installed generation capacity increased from 19.5 GW, in 1975, to 21GW, in 1976.

Certainly it was the expectation of this really much accelerated electricity demand growth rate as well as our high external energy dependence that led the government to sign the agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. In fact, the energy dependence of our country can be evaluated by the imports of 300 million oil barrels in 1977 that reached, according to estimates then made, 313 million barrels in 1978 compared to the national production of only 61 million barrels annually.

Projections of the electric energy then made estimated that it should reach 50 GW from nuclear origin in 2005. This objective, should it have been reached, would increase the participation of nuclear energy in the electric system to about 71%, practically approaching the Brazilian situation to the present nuclear participation in the French generation system, which is the most important in the world!

Cooperation with Germany started with the Brasília Protocol, signed in October 3, 1974, and it was formalized by the Bonn agreement which would guide the relationship between the two countries regarding the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The agreement would cover all phases of nuclear technology development from mining to the construction of power plants each one generating 1.35 GW. Surprisingly, the organizational structure adopted by NUCLEBRAS, in December 16, 1974, before the signature of the agreement between the two countries, was organized in such a way as to satisfy in all details the various German enterprises that would participate in the implementation of the program.

The different enterprises that were then structured had variable capital composition. NUCLAM, for mineral exploitation, had 51’% of national capital; NUCLEN, for engineering project and service, 75%; NUCLEP, for development project execution, fabrication and commercialization of heavy components, 98.2%; NUCLEI, for enriched uranium production, 75%.

In the last case, since uranium enrichment technology transfer to Brazil has been blocked by intervention of England, partner of Germany and Holland in the company that produced this material – URENCO -, it was chosen the development of a new technology called “jet nozzle”, still very incipient. Several enterprises that were responsible for specific sectors joined NUCON in the construction of the power plants that was until then reserved to Furnas Centrais Elétricas, subsidiary of ELETROBRÁS.

NUCON was deactivated by the Decree No 90.398, in November 7 de 1984, due to conflicts that arose between the traditional electric sector and NUCLEBRÁS.

The extremely complex structure of NUCLEBRÁS aimed at, according to their administrators at the time, guaranteeing the technical responsibility and the effective technology transfer by the German partner in each phase of the Program. According to the Program, the enterprises association would also make viable the growing inflow of foreign capital consistent with the needs of the NUCLEBRAS holding activity.

The Brasília Protocol created the expectation, and even the certitude, of the Brazilian authorities that the extremely ambitious program would be totally executed since it was based on the hypothesis of national electric energy demand growth so that it would be necessary to construct at least 9 nuclear power plants of 1.35 GW until 1990.

In fact, even before the FRG Agreement was signed, the Presidency of the Republic had already approved in June 3, 1974 the Explanatory Statement Nº 300 by the Minister of Mines and energy authorizing the construction of the second unit of the “Almirante Álvaro Alberto” Power Plant followed by the Decree of June 13, 1975, determining the construction of a third unit with 1.35 GW (Angra III).

Concerning the construction terms, it was considered that Angra II would be ready in 5.5 years, contrary to the international experience accumulated in countries more developed than Brazil, whose referred terms were rarely reduced to less than 8 or 10 years. As it is known, Agra II was ready in 2000, 23 years after its start in 1977!

The Brazilian Nuclear Program evaluation, from its start until 1986, was carried out by a Presidential Commission created by the Decree Nº 91,606 of September 2, 1985. It was chaired by the present author and its composition is described in Note 11.

It was verified that, contrary to the forecasts at the time concerning the construction of the Angra II e Angra III power plants, different factors would prevent complying with the originally established chronogram.

First of all, the growth rate of both of the GDP and the energy demand was gradually reduced under the impact of the serious crisis in the balance of payments in Brazil due to the acute disturbance in the international economy, intensified by the second oil crisis in 1979. This crisis lasted for the subsequent 20 years resulting in the almost zero growth of the Brazilian economy.

It should be remembered that, concurrently with the Nuclear Program, big projects were started in 1974 in the energy sector as well as in other sectors (Itaipu and Tucuruí, already mentioned; Steel Railway, Açominas, Transamazonic Road, etc.), that had to compete with the nuclear sector regarding the use of internal and mainly external resources that became more and more scarce. These projects, financed with substantial external interests, have contributed to dramatically increasing the Brazilian external debt, a problem that Brazil has faced until recently. That is why in 2005 the Brazilian GDP growth was the second worst of Latin America after that of Haiti.

Besides those very important factors, the problems raised with Angra II’s foundations due to its localization, geologically problematic, have caused initial delays relative to the evaluated chronogram, namely 3.5 years. In fact the power plant was inaugurated in February 2000.

It should be mentioned that similar problems have already occurred in other countries and this experience was not applied here causing disagreement regarding technical standards applicable to the plant’s foundation. The localization of the construction site itself, as already mentioned, produced all kinds of managerial difficulties, notably in the relationship between Furnas and the civil works contractors on one side and Furnas, NUCLEBRÁS and CNEN on the other side. The latter, as it is known, was legally responsible for the safety of the power plant and therefore for the licensing of its construction, following for this purpose the American standards, not connected with the project which was entirely developed according to the basic philosophy of German norms, much more empirical and flexible that that adopted by CNEN.

Regarding Angra III, as generally known, in spite of the acquisition of 45% of the equipment and commitments concerning 35% of the remaining equipment, corresponding to US$ 750 million, it was estimated in 1986 that the total cost would reach about US$ 2.8 billion, including the financial costs. The lack of decision about the conclusion of this plant had as a consequence expenditures of about US$ 20 million annually (excluding financial costs) only for maintenance and conservation of the stored equipment.

It is estimated that should the decision of constructing Angra be made today, the plant would be completed in six years, that is, in 2012. For this purpose it would be necessary an additional injection of US$1.8 billion.

The de facto interruption of the program caused, for example, idle capacity in NUCLEP except for certain services outside its purpose. Similar end had NUCLEBRAs’ Reprocessing Unit, whose construction cost from 1986 on would reach about US$ 240 million. The fuel element plant started in 1977 in Rezende is operating partially. The originally conceived project involved three steps – fuel element assembly, reconversion of uranium hexafluoride to uranium dioxide (UO2) and fabrication of pellets containing enriched uranium. In this plant it was assembled the first recharge of Angra I as well as some subsequent loads of this plant and those of Angra II. From the pilot plant in IPEN for conversion of UF6 into UO2, it was installed in Aramar, in a larger scale, part of the so called Parallel Program.

In spite of the different difficulties pointed out regarding the establishment of the Program, various important research and development projects were carried out both at IPEN and CDTN. Studies relative to conversion, already mentioned, and to isotopic enrichment using the jet nozzle method were carried out at CDTN. The two institutes (CDTN and IPEN) were also involved in projects relative to construction of research reactors. The first one was involved with the production of zirconium (without hafnium), an important component for the fuel elements cladding. In engineering and project management, NUCLEN has developed considerable competence.

It is worthwhile to remember that different other projects, particularly those relative to the development of prototype fuels using thorium and uranium, and thorium and plutonium (where the plutonium oxide is substituted for cerium oxide, its isomorphic, in the experimental development of fuel model) were developed by CDTN in cooperation with different German groups. The first fuel element (thorium-enriched uranium) was designed for both Angra I and Angra II and tested in Germany (it should be remembered that due to the refuse of the United States to supply fuel for Angra I, the German partner, using enriched uranium from URENCO, fabricated the fuel elements for both Angra I and Angra II. Loading of these two reactors still depends on enriched uranium from the same origin, even though it is viable to fabricate them in the Resende Plant).

The performance of the new element containing thorium was not effectively used in our reactors due to the essentially political objection raised by Furnas Centrais Elétricas responsible for the management of the reactors.

According to Ricardo Pinheiro’s account, the documentation of these experiments, carried out successfully through the German-Brazilian cooperation, has been dispersed. It is necessary to gather this documentation in order to resume the experiments mainly those regarding the stimulation for using thorium and consequently increase our energy sources reserves. Besides, this would raise the possibility of international cooperation regarding the use of thorium with countries like India that have important reserves of this element. According to recent announcement, India has decided to construct a pioneer breeder reactor using thorium.

It should be mentioned that cooperation with Germany has permitted a large number of Brazilian companies to have access to the necessary technology to construct Angra II with the quality that is indispensable for such undertaking. The continuation of technology transfer to the industrial sector as well as to other sectors after 1986 was described by Dr. Witold Lepecki.

Various projects were also developed for nuclear fusion along the past years with the support of CNEN in the Universities of Campinas, Federal Fluminense, São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, Brasília and in the National Institute of Spatial Research (INPE), in the Technical Institute of the Air Force (CTA), in the Military Institute of Engineering (IME), in the Institute of Nuclear Engineering (IEN) and in the Institute of Energy and Nuclear Research (IPEN). These activities, even though incipient ones, were resumed mainly in the Brazilian Center of Physics Research under the leadership of Ricardo Galvão, due to the new interest on this technology in projects in cooperation with Cadarache, France.

Regarding personnel training, considerable efforts were made in the ambit of the Pró-Nuclear program to which were allocated US$ 66 million in 1973. The number of people directly involved has reached in 1986 8,669 employees: 3,054 had higher education of which 509 had M.Sc. degree and 167 had Ph.D. degree. As already mentioned, in spite of the interruption of power plant construction the research institutes continued to play an important role in the development of radioisotopes applications in nuclear medicine, agriculture and engineering of materials. In this context it should be remembered that the six post-graduation courses of UFMG created from the 1970s on has formed a high number of M.Sc.’s and Ph.D.’s. As an example, the Chemistry, Physics and Nuclear Techniques areas produced 399 Ph.D.’s and 1,043 M.Sc.’s until 2006.

The efforts made in the three institutes of the nuclear area, including the Institute of Radioprotection and Dosimetry can be evaluated by the respective scientific production previously shown in Graphics I to IX.

8. The Parallel Nuclear Program

As already pointed out, the fuel cycle is, so to speak, the soul of any independent nuclear program. The promise of complete technology transfer in this area, which would be made by the nuclear agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, was frustrated due to the impossibility of transferring to Brazil (or jointly to be developed in our country) the ultra-centrifugation technique for enriching uranium. It is clear that using enriched uranium as fuel not only for Angra I and Angra II but also for the 9 reactors that would be built in the frame of the German-Brazilian cooperation would require from our country efforts for the indigenous development of this cutting-edge technology. Furthermore, the jet nozzle technology that was offered was not only incipient at that time of the agreement but according to (theoretical) analysis it consumed too much energy and it is too expensive now. On the other, its practical execution in pilot scale in CDTN was never carried out because financial resources were not available.

In these circumstances, IPEN, in cooperation with engineers of the National Navy, under the leadership of Dr. Othon Pinheiro da Silva, started from 1978 on the development of the ultracentrifugation technology for producing fuel to feed submarines with nuclear propulsion. This enrichment project was a technological success and it is described in the nº 54 issue of the Economy and Energy periodical (ref 25). The success of this undertaking is a major conquest of the Brazilian technology that will permit, when the development of our nuclear program will be resumed, the desired national independence regarding the fuel cycle.

The vital strategic character of mastering the fuel cycle was demonstrated when the Carter administration refused in 1977 to supply enriched uranium for Angra I, a reactor fabricated by Westinghouse. This fact has created a crisis that was overcome by the agreement with Germany that permitted not only to supply uranium enriched by Urenco but also developed the fabrication of fuel elements for Angra I by KWU. This technology as well as that used for producing fuel elements for Angra II was transferred to the national Nuclear Fuel Plant in Resende.

The recent installation of two ultra-centrifugation units in that fuel elements plant by the Ministry of Science and Technology is auspicious since it represents the first step for resuming the activities of the sector that has been virtually suspended in spite of the pressing need to resume them.

 

9. The National Energy Matrix and the Thermal Generation to Complement the Hydroelectric Park.

The probable future of thermonuclear energy in Brazil is analyzed in a recent document of the National Energy Plan (ref 26). In this document different alternatives, particularly those relative to the future thermal complement (nuclear or not) to hydroelectric generation, that represents 285 TWh, that is, 10.7 % of the potential of the country that is technically recoverable (2003 data).

The internal energy supply between 1971 and 2002 reached the annual average rate of 6.4%; the share of nuclear energy in the electric internal supply was only 9.5 TWh in 2005, equivalent to 2.2% of the total.

In 2005 the hydroelectricity was responsible for 340.5 TWh, that is 77.1% of the total; 8.3% of hydroelectricity were imported, the remaining part had thermal origin.

These results should be compared with the consumption of 270 TWh foreseen by the author through modeling described in the nº 45 issue of the Economy and Energy periodical (ref 27). The forecast made in 1988 is shown in Figure 20 of reference 28. The hydroelectric share in the future national generation that is assumed to be much higher than the present one should be carefully examined according to the article A “Destination Port” for the Brazilian Electric System” (ref 49).

It should be remembered that:

1º) the Brazilian electricity generation system is characterized by its continental dimension and by the strong predominance of hydro generation;

2º) the dimension of Brazil has created the expectation that seasonal differences among the various regions are complementary, guaranteeing the comfortable expansion of the hydroelectric system;

3º) based on 70 years of rainfall statistics, it is shown that it is possible to develop a very simple modeling for each region separately, except for the South region that has an unpredictable behavior;

4º) the hypothesis that there is no inexhaustible hydrous reserve available at any time in the Amazon region is highly arguable since it has the longest dry season of the various regions.

The study also focuses the drastic reduction of hydraulic energy stock of our reservoirs (dams) that has decreased from two years to six months presently.

This situation makes it indispensable to use thermal generation to complement hydro electric generation.

Among the existing options, the use of fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas) is increasingly more inconvenient due to its contribution to the greenhouse effect. Excluding the possibility of a larger share of biomass energy, the contribution of this source presents problems of competition in the use of soil and also, in some cases, seasonal problems except for sugarcane whose bagasse is used to generate electricity in the inter-harvest period.

The relative participation of the different sources of primary energy, described by Marchetti in 1985 and updated until 2005 by Carlos Feu, is shown in Graphic X (ref 26) where it can be noticed that after a too fast growth of nuclear energy, its demand will follow a slower rhythm in the next years (reaching the share of 17% in 2030).

 

Graphic X – Share of Primary Energy Sources in World Consumption: (a) until 1985 and (b) updated

The present situation regarding the use of this energy has accelerated from 1965 on, however it has decreased in 1970s, as shown in Graphic XI.

Graphic XI –Nuclear Energy in the World: Installed Nuclear Generation

The present participation of nuclear energy in the world electricity generation is close to 15.5%; Marchetti’s forecast has limited it to 17% in 2030 and predicts that the future participation of this energy would be modest even considering the considerable inertial growth of this source at that time. In what concerns Brazil, this participation would reach 5% in that year corresponding to 18.9 GW, according to Table I from reference (24).

Table I –Installed Capacity of Electricity Production by Public Service Plants

It can be concluded that in any hypothesis, hydro electricity will continue to have a dominant participation in the national energy matrix considering the available potential estimated in 265 GW which is regionally distributed in a regular form as shown in Figure III. In this figure it is also presented the two growth rates foreseen for 2030 according to the hypothesis of GDP of 3.8% annually (high) and 3.0% annually (low), respectively, in this period. The annual growth of the installed potential would then be 4.2% and 3.1%.

 

Figure II – Hydroelectricity in Brazil and its planned growth (Plan 2030).

In conclusion, I want to emphasize the fundamental importance of two problems that have not been solved and which affect the nuclear sector as a whole. The first one concerns the accelerated loss of human resources that were trained along the program not only because of “Pró-Nuclear” but also those who afterwards have followed university graduation courses in the area. Aging of technical personnel and non offer of jobs as consequence of no substantial nuclear activity indicates a situation of intolerable waste.

It should be remembered that until 1986 the Committee for Evaluation of the Brazilian Nuclear Program has checked that US$ 4.200 billion were invested in the sector, excluding the financial costs, which would reach US$ 1.800 million concerning only the nuclear power plants, if their foreseen chronogram would have been followed. In Note 12 it is reproduced Tables I, II and III of the mentioned report (ref 17). No comments.

It should be also emphasized that the nuclear safety question is affected by the fact that the organ that licenses and inspects all activities – CNEN – is contradictorily also responsible for the execution of current activities not only in its own laboratories and connected industries but also for activities that involve nuclear radiation in the whole country. This dangerous practice that has been denounced along the years, particularly by the Committee for Evaluation of the Brazilian Nuclear Program, has not earned the attention it requires. So, the Goiana accident has faded into oblivion and similarly the necessary duplication and maintenance of the Rio-São Paulo road, indispensable for the evacuation of the Angra dos Reis population in case of accident in the power plants, which cannot be absolutely discarded. Regarding this issue, the present author, as acting President of the Brazilian Academy of Sciences has alerted the President of the Republic in May 1992 to the need of examining this question when it was announced that the Federal Government planned restructuring the nuclear sector (Annex 2). In the first Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, the author, questioned during his visit to the Angra dos Reis plants by the then Representative Marcondes Perillo, presently Governor of Goiás, has suggested that the solution to this acute problem would be the adoption of similar legislation that is in force in Spain. It is evident that the bill presented by the current Goiás Governor did not pass.

Finally, continuation of Angra III construction stresses the urgency of resuming the Nuclear Program activities vis-à-vis the incertitude of unpredictable alterations regarding the cost and availability of fossil fuels, as the nuclear participation is important for the thermal complementation of our hydroelectric generation.  

It should also be mentioned the importance of resuming studies concerning the use of thorium for producing nuclear energy in our country. As it is known, the technology for producing thorium oxide from monazite sands is completely mastered by Brazil since the 1950s.

The contribution of Doctors Ricardo Pinheiro, Witold Lepecki and Sérgio Filgueiras will certainly bring extensive information about the subject that again is attracting the attention of public opinion.

A summary of the present article was orally presented at the initial session of the Francisco Magalhães Gomes Symposium, organized by the Nuclear Development Center in August 21, 2006. Even though long, it only summarizes some episodes of the agitated story of nuclear energy in our country.

10. Credits

This article was produce due to the invaluable access to information from CNEN and CDTN through Drs. Ailton Fernando Dias and Sérgio Almeida Cunha Filgueiras. I thank professor Ricardo Brant Pinheiro for information regarding certain aspects of the Thorium Group activities and professors Márcio Quintão Moreno and Omar Campos Ferreira for careful reading the text and making frequent corrections; the latter for co-production of Graphic III. I thank Dr. Carlos Feu Alvim and the Economy and Energy staff for their valuable suggestions and frequent discussion on the subject. Much of the data used came from the Report on the Evaluation of the Brazilian Nuclear Program 1986 (ref 16). Bibliographic information regarding CDTN’s scientific production was kindly gathered by its librarian Ms. Lenira Santos to whom I am very grateful. I thank Professor José Domingos Fabris for the information relative to the scientific production of the ICEX Chemistry Department of UFMG as well as in the Department of Fundamental Research of the Grenoble Center of Nuclear Studies, France. I also thank engineer Mateus Vargas Garzon for making Graphics I, II, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII and IX. Finally I thank Patrícia Bastos Leão for her competence and patience which were inestimable for writing this article.

11 - References

(1) Henri Becquerel, Académie des Sciences, 24 Fev; 3,9,30 Mars et 18 Mai, (1896).

(2) H. Hertz, Ann. d. Phys., 31, 983 (1887); ver também A. l. Hughes e l. A. Du Bridge, Photoelectric Phenomena, McGraw Hill, New York, (1932).

(3) Goldschmidt, B., Atomic Rivals, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick and London, 1990.

(4) J. Costa Ribeiro em Fernando de Azevedo, As Ciências no Brasil, vol. I, cap. III, p. 163, Edições Melhoramento, São Paulo, (1955).

(5) Guimarães, Djalma, Anais da Academia Brasileira de Ciências. I, n.4,198-200 (1929).

(6) Othon H. Leonardos em Fernando de Azevedo, As Ciências no Brasil, vol I, cap VI, p.276, Edições Melhoramento, São Paulo, (1955). Ver também Luiz Cintra do Prado em “A Radioatividade nas Águas Hidrotermais Brasileiras”, Escolas Profissionais Salesianas, USP, (1938).

(7) Lattes, C. M. G., Muirhead, H., Occhialini, G. P. S. and Powell, C. F. Processes involving charged mesons. Nature, 159, 694 - 697, (1947).

(8) Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, Henry De Wolf Smyth. Acesso 16, jun, 2006.

http://www.atomicarchive.com/docs/Smith/Report.

(9) C. V. Dutra, Anais da Escola de Minas de Ouro Preto, 55 (3), 185 – 192, (2002).

(10) Vargas, J. I., Science in Brazil, Academia Brasileira de Ciências, Rio de Janeiro, (2000).  

(11) Machado, Ninon, Rev. Dir. Nucl, Rio de Janeiro 3 (2) ,(1981).

(12) A. Girotto, Rev. Dir. Nucl, Rio de Janeiro, 3 (2): 33 – 37, (1981).

(13) Forman, John M. A., Rev. Dir. Nucl, Rio de Janeiro, 3 (2): (1981)

(14) Cordani, U. G., Iyer, S. S., Taylor, P. N., Kawashita, K., Sato, K., MCreath, I. ?Pb-Pb,  Rb-Sr and K-Ar systematics of the Lagoa Real Uranium province (South-central Bahia, Brazil) and the Espinhaço cycle, Journal of South American Earth Sciences., v.5, p.33 - 46, 1992.

(15) Lattes, C.M.G., Fugimoto, Y. e Hasegawa, S., Phys. Report, Phys. Let, 65 (3), (1990).

(16) “Proceedings of a Study Group on the Utilization of Research Reactors”, São Paulo, 4-8 nov. (1963).

(17) Avaliação do Programa Nuclear Brasileiro, Relatório ao Presidente da República, Brasília, 17, abr, (1986).

(18) Santos J.C., Brito S.S.  (CNEN), Mello J.C, and Urban C.W.,  (IPR), “Thorium-cycle possibilities in the Brazilian nuclear programme”,  in “Utilization of Thorium Power Reactors”, IAEA, (Technical Reports Series No52). Viena, (1966).

(19) “The INSTINTO Project – A status and progress report on the Thorium reactor development program”,  “Staff Report”, Thorium Group, in Summary report of the meeting “ Working Group on Thorium Utilization”, IAEA, Viena, 12-14 Dec, (1966).

(20) Brito, S. Salvio and Lepecki, W.P.S, “Preliminary assessment of heavy-water thorium reactors in the Brazilian Nuclear programme”, in Symposium on Heavy-Water Power Reactors, IAEA, Vienna, 11-15 set, (1967).  Proceedings, IAEA, Viena (1968).

(21) http:nucleargreen.blogspot.com.br/2011//08/indian-and-chinese-development.html, do dia 23.8.2011

(22) Summary of the Objectives, the Design, and a Program of Development of Molten -Salt Breeder Reactors, ORNL 851, June 1967

(23) Comparison of Thorium and Uranium Fuel Cycles NNL (11) 11.593, Issue 5, March 2012 (copyright National Nuclear Lab.Ltd.)

(24) Vargas J. I., The technological prospective: Prediction with a simple mathematical modeling, Economy & Energy, 45-46, (2004). 

(25) Pinheiro da Silva, Othon e Marques Ferreira, André Luiz, O Enriquecimento do Urânio no Brasil, Economia & Energia, 54, (2006)

(26) Geração Termonuclear, Plano Nacional de Energia 2030, Ministério de Minas e Energia, Brasília, 14 jun, (2006).

(27) Vargas J.I., A Prospectiva Tecnológica: previsão com um simples modelo matemático, Economia e Energia, 45, p. 24, 2005. e Gráfico V do presente trabalho, devido a Carlos Feu Alvim e J. I. Vargas.

(28) Vargas J. I., “The Brazilian Energy Scenario and the Environment: an Overview”, Ciência e Sociedade Séries, Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia, Brasil, (1992) (CBPF -CS-003/92).

(29) Feu Alvim Carlos (coordenador), José Israel Vargas, Othon Luiz Pinheiro da Silva, Omar Campos Ferreira e Frida Eidelman; Um Porto de Destino para o Sistema Elétrico Brasileiro _ Características dos Sistemas Elétricos Integrados do Brasil e sua Projeção até o Horizonte de 2005_ Economia e Energia, 49, (2005).

12 - Notes

Note 1 (p. 12) – It is surprising that the functions of lithium were already known, an element used in the future production of the hydrogen bomb; of lead 208 and cadmium, element used in the control bars of power reactors. It is possible that reference to lithium is due to its use as protons target, produced in a cyclotron as a neutron source that is 3,600 times more intense than the radium-beryllium source which was then the only one to determine k, the multiplication coefficient of the uranium-graphite, studied by Fermi and Szilard.

Note 2 (p. 14) - The Commission was composed of: Bernardino de Mattos, as chairman, and Arthur Moses, Bernardo Geisel, Carlos Chagas Filho, Elisiário Távora, Ernani de Motta Rezende, Francisco Maffei, Joaquim Costa Ribeiro, José Leite Lopes, Luiz Cintra Prado, Marcello Damy de Souza Santos and Luiz Pilla.

Note 3 (p. 21) - CNEN, since its establishment 47 years ago and up to now, was subordinated to different administrative institutions. Until 1967, Presidency of the Republic; between1967 and 1986, Ministry of Mines and Energy (Decree nº 60,900/67); from 1986 to 1999, Presidency of the Republic (Secretariat of National Defense Consultancy, SADEN/PR, Secretariat of Strategic Matters, SAE/PR and Extraordinary Ministry of Strategic Projects, MEPE/PR, according to Decrees nº 93,337/86 and nº 2,823/99 and Law nº 8,028/90); and finally, from 1999 on, the Ministry of Science and Technology ( MP n 1,911/99). It is obvious that this varied subordination reflects the big fluctuations of our nuclear policy.

Note 4 (p. 24) - Cooperation with France was intensified with the visit of the present author to that country in 1961, invited by Jean Debièsse then director of the Saclay Laboratory, connected with the French Atomic Energy Commission who visited Brazil in that year. After missions to France of dozens Brazilian scientists and technicians, French specialists came to Brazil for cooperation in all areas involved with the project of nuclear power plants to be fueled with metallic natural uranium, moderated by graphite and refrigerated by carbonic gas. This cooperation in power reactors was interrupted in 1964 and resumed, with much less intensity in the ambit of the Thorium Project, conceived at IPR, which lasted until the end of 1973 when opted for the acquisition of a pressurized-water, enriched-uranium-fuelled power reactor (PWR) from the United State (Angra I). See also note 8.

Note 5 (p. 27) – The commission responsible for formulating the safeguards regime, in which Brazil participated, remained blocked: the USSR was against the inspection system which it considered as a mere spying instrument; France abstained, maintaining that it would impair the development of its own program; the developing countries like India, Brazil and Iran were against the referred mechanisms because they consider it discriminatory and detrimental to their interest. I remember that as a consequence of a series of explosions of Chinese atomic bombs both France and USSR have adhered to most of the items of the safeguards system. Therefore the difficulty created relative to the implantation of the inspection system was overcome and at the same time the members of the atomic club were exempted from it. This privilege benefits not only those pioneer countries of the system but also the non-signatories of the Treaty of Non Proliferation (TNP) such as India, Pakistan and Israel.

The IAEA’s Board of Governors was composed of three groups of countries: members of the Atomic Club that have nuclear weapons; countries that have important reserves of atomic minerals in their own territory or in their colonies; and the most developed countries of each continent. Brazil was part of the last group due to its active and independent participation as well as its scale of development since the beginning of the nuclear era. The United States have contested the Brazilian condition of most advanced country of the region; the United States government proposed that our participation in the IAEA would be alternated with that of Argentina. For this purpose, the Board of Governors designated a committee of three members, chaired by the physicist Gunnar Randers, to hear the delegation of each country: the Argentine delegation was directed by Admiral Quihillalt assisted by three specialist while the Brazilian one was directed by professor Marcelo Damy de Souza Santos, assisted by F. B. Franco-Netto, Luiz Cintra do Prado and the present author. The committee met with the interested parties in Paris during one month in order to formulate conclusive recommendations to the Board of Governors about the issue. As it was easy to foresee, the technical commission did not achieve any result and addressed the issue back to the Board. According to the IAEA statute, the decision would be reached through voting. Evaluation of votes suggested a probable victory of Brazil but this was not consolidated because Brazil withdrew its candidacy in the last moment according to governmental instructions. Since then, Brazil participates in the Board alternating with Argentina. (Board of Governors, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/INF/ 74, 2 Jul 1962.)

Note 6 (p.28) –The different agreements for controlling nuclear production use and tests were the following:

 1°) August 1963: Treaty that prohibits tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in the outer space and in oceans.

 2°) February 1967: Tlatelolco Treaty, that prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America and Caribbean, which was only confirmed in 1994 after many.

 3°) July 1968: Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that prohibits the official five nuclear weapons states to transfer material and technology to other countries. On the other hand, these countries agree never to produce nuclear bombs.

4°) February 1971:  Prohibits tests of nuclear weapons and mass destruction weapons at the bottom of the ocean and underground

 5°) May 1972: Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union about limitation of anti-ballistic missiles systems.  

6°) June 1973: Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union about prevention of nuclear war.

 7°) June 1979: The United States and the Soviet Union have signed an agreement that limits the qualitative and quantitative growth of strategic nuclear weapons.

 8°) April 1995: The United Nations Security Council guarantees assistance to nations that are signatory of the NPT which are object of or threatened by nuclear attack.  

9°) September 1996: Treaty of Nuclear Tests Prohibition to which 155 countries have adhered but India, Pakistan and North Korea have refused to sign it.  

10°) May 2000: The five nuclear weapon states signed an agreement to make efforts to eliminate totally their nuclear arsenals.

 11°) December 2003: Iran signs the Protocol additional to the NPT; at the same time Libya announces that it has renounced de development of mass destruction weapons.  

12°) December 2004: North Korea announces that it possesses nuclear bomb.

Note 7 (p.35) – As a consequence of this visit and my favorable position regarding the autonomous development of the fuel cycle in Brazil using thorium, according to reliable source, the National Security Council has proposed and obtained a secret decree that has prohibited the Brazilian Nuclear Commission to maintain relationships with the present author.

Note 8 (p. 38) – Staff of the Thorium Group in December 1966: Wiltold Piotr Stefan Lepecki, Carlos Márcio Mascarenhas Dale, Sérgio de Salvo Brito, Jair Carlos Mello, Carlos Alberto Ferreira Lima, Fernando Antônio Nogueira Carneiro, José Mendonça de Lima, Ricardo Brant Pinheiro, Carlos Werth Urban, Walkírio Ronaldo Andrada Lavorato, Paulo de Carvalho Tófani, Paulo Márcio Furtado, João Luiz Campos, Juarez Távora Veado, Paulo M. Guedes, Serafim M. Lages, Guido Afonso Lages and Borisas Cimbleris. In 1967the staff included: Jair Carlos Mello, Ricardo Brant Pinheiro, Carlos Alberto Ferreira Lima, Fernando Antônio Nogueira Carneiro and José Mendonça de Lima, Carlos Márcio Mascarenhas Dale, Carlos Werth Urban and Walkírio Ronaldo Andrada Lavorato, Paulo Márcio Furtado and Paulo de Carvalho Tófani, João Luiz Campos, Juarez Távora Veado, Paulo M. Guedes, Serafim M. Lages, Guido Afonso Lages and Borisas Cimbleris. The following post-graduation students also participated: M.S.B. Faria, L.F.B.M. Campos, M. E. L. Torres, G.P. Guimarães, Eustáquio Van Petten Machado and José Eduardo Morais Filho.

Note 9 (p. 40) –No matter how inconsistent was the policy adopted by CDTN, which caused the migration of many technicians and scientists to the University, this fact permitted the creation of 6 high level post-graduation courses in Metallurgy, Physics, Computation Science, Nuclear Techniques and Sciences, Thermal Engineering and Chemistry. A high number of specialists in these areas had an important role in the development of basic industrial technology area (industrial quality, under the leadership of professor Juarez Távora Veado from the Metallurgy Department of the Minas Gerais University and from IPR), as well as in the definition of public policies for the Environmental area (creation of COPAM, Environment Policy Commission of the Minas Gerais State). It was also important the participation of engineers from the nuclear sector in the development of the National Alcohol Program; ironically, they have contributed, as members of the João Pinheiro Foundation, to the formulation of a personnel training program (the Pró-Nuclear), at the request of President Ernesto Geisel himself, during a lunch in the National Congress Club, during the activities of the Federal Congress Commission regarding the Brazilian Nuclear Program. This Commission was chaired by the then Senator Franco Montoro. Pró-Nuclear, managed by CNPq, was very successful and was an effective help to satisfy the personnel demand stimulated by the future agreement with Germany.

Note 10 (p. 47) IPEN has probably escaped from this arbitrary measure not only because it was an autarchy of Minas Gerais but because it was involved in other projects excluded from the safeguards rules established by the IAEA, applied to NUCLEBRAS and soon after to CDTN and IEN, which became part of this enterprise. This permitted IPEN, which was linked to CNEN, to establish cooperation with the Brazilian Navy from 1978 on for the development of ultracentrifugation. According to the agreement with Germany, CDTN would absorb the enrichment technology foreseen in the agreement which, as it is known, was very limited (see reference 16 where it is also describe the initiative of the Air Force Technical Center to obtain the isotopic uranium enrichment using lasers).

Note 11 (p. 52) – The Brazilian Nuclear Program Evaluation Commission was chaired by the present author and Professor Oscar Salla was vice-chairman. The Commission was composed of: Alberto Pereira de Castro (IPT), Caspar Erich Stemer (UFSC), Eduardo Penna Franca (UFRJ), Fernando Cláudio Zawislak (UFRGS), José Ephim Mindlin (Metal Leve), José Pelúcio Ferreira (FINEP), Luiz Renato Caldas (UFRJ), Paulo Francini (FIESP), Marcelo Damy de Souza Santos (IEA and USP), Ramayana Gazzinelli (UFMG), José Leite Lopes (CBPF and representing the MST), José Guilherme Araújo Lameira Bittencourt (IBQN), Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves (Secretariat of CSN), Roberto Rodrigues Krause (MRE), José Wanderley Coelho Dias (Nuclebrás). Representatives of the Planning Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic, of the Financial Ministry and of the Ministry of Urban Development and Environment were invited as observers.

The Commission has alerted, in its recommendation number 4, that: “Considering the advanced development of the national program of pacific applications of nuclear energy in Brazil and Argentina, that are actually equivalent, the bilateral nuclear cooperation should be intensified, aiming at, among others, the promotion of joint undertakings in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as the establishment of a gradual mechanism of mutual inspection of these activities in the two countries.”

Note 12 (p. 67) – Three tables show investments consolidation in the nuclear fuel cycle and in nuclear plants, excluding financial costs. Source: CAPNB (1986)

 

 

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The data analysis is made in the The American cold essay in this issue.

 

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